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The Department of Administrative Services files
this brief in support of its Petition for Certiorari to set
aside a Report and Order on Stipulation and Agreement dated
December 31, 1981 (Report and Order) of the Utah Public
Service Commission whereby the Commission approved a Stipulation and Agreement among Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Wexpro
Company, the Division of Public Utilities, and the Committee
of Consumer Services.

The Report and Order is in

wholesale

violation and disregard of this Court's decision and mandate
in Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service
sion, 595 P.2d 871 (1979).

Commis-

The Report and Order divests the

Commission of jurisdiction over public utilities and public
utility properties; allows an unregulated subsidiary of
Mountain Fuel to sell natural gas produced from utility
properties to Mountain Fuel at market price; allows Mountain
Fuel to transfer its utility function of exploring for oil
and gas to subsidiaries without any determination whether
such a transfer is in the public interest; and allows
Mountain Fuel shareholders to expropriate utility properties
without an adequate determination that they are paying fair
market value.

By approving the Stipulation and Agreement,

the Public Service Commission not only disregarded this
Court's mandate, but knuckled under to Mountain Fuel and its
shareholders, who presented the Commission with a fait
accompli that it would not engage in a regulated exploration
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and development program, and then launched what the Division
characterized below as an extraordinary attack on this
Court's decision in three separate legal forums.
THE CASES ON REVIEW
The Report and Order on Stipulation and Agreement
which this brief seeks to reverse was entered with respect to
the following cases.
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY FOR A GENERAL
INCREASE IN RATES AND CHARGES INCIDENT TO
NATURAL GAS SERVICE RENDERED WITHIN THE STATE
OF UTAH.
CASE NO. 77-057-03
(Count II)
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF MOUNTAIN
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY FOR A GENERAL INCREASE IN
RATES AND CHARGES INCIDENT TO NATURAL GAS
SERVICE RENDERED WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH.
CASE NO. 79-057-03
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF MOUNTAIN
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY FOR A GENERAL INCREASE IN
RATES AND CHARGES INCIDENT TO NATURAL GAS
SERVICE RENDERED WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH.
CASE NO. 80-057-01
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF MOUNTAIN
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY FOR A GENERAL INCREASE IN
RATES AND CHARGES INCIDENT TO NATURAL GAS
SERVICE RENDERED WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH.
CASE NO. 81-057-01
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE DIVISION
OF PUBLIC UTILITIES TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSED
TRANSFER OF CERTAIN WELLS, LEASES, LANDS AND
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RELATED FACILITIES AND INTERESTS OF MOUNTAIN
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY TO WEXPRO COMPANY ON
REMAND FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
CASE NO. 76-057-14
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
TRANSFER OF CERrrAIN WELLS, LANDS, LEASES AND
RELATED BUILDINGS AND INTERESTS OF MOUNTAIN
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY AND/OR WEXPRO COMPANY TO
CELSIUS ENERGY COMPANY OR ANY OTHER ENTITY OR
PERSON.
CASE NO. 81-057-04.
The Report and Order is the final order of the
Public Service Commission (Corrunission)
and 81-057-04.

in Case Nos. 76-057-14

Case No. 76-057-14 is the case remanded to

the Conunission by this Court's decision in Committee of
Consumer Services, supra, commonly referred to as the "Wexpro
case."

Case No. 81-057-04 arose during proceedings before

the Commission on remand in the Wexpro case when the Division
of Public Utilities moved for a ternp<;>rary restraining order
and preliminary injunction to enjoin Mountain Fuel Supply
Company's attempt, without Commission sanction, to transfer
oil and gas wells, leases and related property to a
newly-created subsidiary, Celsius Energy Company (Celsius).
Mountain Fuel created Celsius in response to this Court's
decision in the Wexpro case.

The Corrunission established

Docket No. 81-057-04 to hear the Celsius matter.
Case Nos. 77-057-03, 79-057-03, 80-057-01 and
81-057-01 are general rate cases.

The Report and Order
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resolves contingencies in final orders previously entered in
those cases, i.e., the rates set in those cases are to be
adjusted by proceeds from oil and gas assets to the extent
the Wexpro case determines those proceeds are available to
reduce rates.
The issues resolved in the Report and Order are all
based on issues determined by this Court in the Wexpro case.
PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS OF THE WEXPRO CASE
AND THE POST-REMAND PROCEEDINGS
The regulatory proceedings which culminated in
the Report and Order were commenced by a Petition for Investigation filed by the Division of Public Utilities
(Division) on December 17, 1976, and designated Case No.
76-057-14.

The Petition was occasioned by Mountain Fuel's

announced intention to convey all of its claimed
"non-utility" "oil" properties, including reserves, leases
and related facilities,

to a newly-formed, wholly- owned

subsidiary, Wexpro, in exchange for all of the common stock
of Wexpro at depreciated book value and to enter into a joint
exploration arrangement with Wexpro to explore Mountain
Fuel's wildcat acreage.

The transfer was reflected in an

Agreement of Purchase and Sale (P&S Agreement) and the
exploration arrangement in a Joint Exploration Agreement
(JEA).

Both agreements were between Mountain Fuel and
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Wexpro.
2. 1

Committee of Consumer Services, supra.

MFS 1 &

Mountain Fuel from the inception took the categorical

position that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the
transfer of properties from Mountain Fuel to Wexpro.

Hear-

ing 12/29/76 at 24.
The Petition for Investigation asked the Public
Service Commission to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over
these transactions and to determine after an evidentiary
hearing whether they were in the public interest.

Petition

1 The following abbreviations are used for purposes of
citation in this brief: With respect to the record made
prior to remand of the Wexpro case, (1) "Ord." by date and
without case number refers to orders in the Wexpro case;
( 2) "Tr." refers to the transcript page number from the
evidentiary hearings September 12 through October 28, 1977,
(3) other transcript citations are given by page and date,
(4) citations to exhibits are to the exhibit number used in
that proceeding--Mountain Fuel exhibits are referred to as
MFS, Division exhibits are referred to as DIV- , and Salt
Lake-County Exhibits are referred to as SLC-_; (5} pleadings
or other papers are cited by the title and/or description,
and (6) orders by case number and date only, refer to Corrunission orders in the cited case.
With respect to the post-remand record, ( 1) R. __ refers to
transcript page number and to the record citation to all
other pleadings, papers and orders; (2) pleadings or other
papers are cited by title and/or description, with a designation to the place in the record.
For example, Petition for
the Establishment of a Fund for Attorneys' and Expert Witness
Fees for the Division of Public Utilities, R.
2506; (3) the
Report and Order on Stipulation and Agreement R. 007, was
only designated with a record number on every other page, and
for that reason citations in this Memorandum to the Report
and Order are given by original page and/or paragraph
number.
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for Investigation at 3.

The issues raised by the Petition

for Investigation included (1) "are the assets being transferred,

in fact non-utility property, and have they always

been non-utility property" and (2) "do the utility ratepayers and the utility operations have any interest
oil operations of Mountain Fuel Supply Co."

in the

Petition for

Investigation,,, 6(a), 6(j).
Without ever having held any evidentiary hearing,
the Public Service Conunission on July 20, 1977, at the urging
of Mountain Fuel, issued a Final Report and Order holding the
Commission had no jurisdiction over the transaction transferring Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" properties to
Wexpro.

The Order terminated the case.

Ord. 7/20/77 at

4-5.
While motions for rehearing were pending, on August
23, 1977 the Commission heard a report from the parties concerning a proposed settlement by Mountain Fuel which provided
for the amendment of the P&S Agreement and the JEA.
On August 29, 1977, the Commission entered its
Order on the Petitions for Rehearing.

The Commission af-

firmed its July 20 Order and denied the Petitions for Rehearing, except that the Commission granted a rehearing for the
purpose of having Mountain Fuel present the amendments to the
P&S Agreement and the JEA that it had proposed at the August
23 conference.

Ord. 8/29/77.
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On September 12, 1977, the Commission commenced an
evidentiary hearing under the scope of the Commission's Order
of August 29, 1977.

The evidentiary hearing on Mountain

Fuel's proposed amendments to the Wexpro agreements continued
for 18 days.
On April ll, 1978, the Commission adopted verbatim
an 80-page Order prepared by counsel for Mountain Fuel.
Letter of transmittal by Mountain Fuel and Proposed Report
and Order on Rehearing, 11/10/77.
its position that it

ha~

The Commission affirmed

no jurisdiction over the properties

held in Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" accounts, and
rejected the Division's and Committee's positions that the
ratepayers were entitled to have the net prof its from the oil
operations applied to reduce rates.

The Commission pass[ed]

on every significant issue of fact and law" raised by the
Mountain Fuel-Wexpro .transactions.

Ord. 4/11/78 at

~

100.

This Court reversed the April 11, 1978 Order and
remanded "for a hearing in accordance with the principles set
forth in this opinion."
supra, at 873.

Committee of Consumer Services,

This Court ordered, among other things, that

a hearing must be held to determine whether the assets were
utility assets pursuant to a three-pronged test.

This Court

also ordered that the proceeds from utility assets must
reduce gas rates and that any transfer of utility assets
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must be for fair market value.

According to this Court's

test, virtually all the assets transferred to Wexpro are, as
a matter of law, utility assets.
Mountain Fuel, Wexpro, Alex Oblad, Harold Burton
and Carlyle Harmon filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court (Petition for
Certiorari), submitted herewith as Appendix "A".

Their

petition states that this Court's opinion held that the
"non-utility" oil properties transferred by Mountain Fuel to
Wexpro "had always been and are utility assets, and that
these properties and the oil revenues generated therefrom
should be 'applied to reduce the cost of gas' to the Utah
utility customer." Mountain Fuel Petition for Certiorari at
13.

The Petition for Certiorari stated that this Court's

Order was reviewable in that "all that remains is an
accounting proceeding." Petition for Certiorari at 17, n.7.
Certiorari was denied on January 7, 1980.

Mountain Fuel

Supply Company v. Utah Commission of Consumer Services, 444
U.S. 1014 (1980).
Thereafter, on remand before the Commission, Mountain Fuel's shareholders launched what the Division characterized below as an extraordinary attack on this Court's
decision, including, in the Division's words,
an attempt to make this hearing more than a
ministerial proceeding by introducing convoluted evidence on the issues of shareholder
contribution, shareholder risk, and their
analysis of the "public interest." [This is]
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only an attempt to relitigate issues on which
Mountain Fuel has already lost but an
affront to [the Public Service] Co~nission in
light of Mountain Fuel's statement to the
United States Supreme Court.
Utah Department of Business Regulation, Division of
Public Utilities' Hearing Brief on Remand (Division Brief on
Remand), R. 2482, at 2491.
On remand, no evidentiary hearing of any kind was
ever held until after Mountain Fuel, Wexpro, the Division,
and the Committee executed the Stipulation and Agreement.
The evidentiary hearings held after the execution of the
Agreement were limited to the issue whether or not the
Stipulation and Agreement should be approved.
The Commission issued its Report and Order approving the Stipulation and Agreement on December 31, 1981.
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S POSITION
The plaintiff in suITu.nary claims:
(a)

The Report and Order on Stipulation and

Agreement errs in divesting the Commission of its statutory
jurisdiction.

This Court held in the Wexpro case that the

Commission has jurisdiction over Mountain Fuel's oil and gas
operations and properties because the exploration and
development of oil and gas is a utility business, and because
the ratepayers bore the risk of exploration and development
of oil and gas.

This Court held that properties explored and

developed with ratepayer funds are utility assets.

This
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Court also held that Wexpro is a public utility, and under
this Court's decision Celsius, a newly created subsidiary
which will own Mountain Fuel's wildcat acreage, is as a
matter of law a public utility.

The Commission, however, in

approving the Stipulation and Agreement, divested itself of
jurisdiction over utility assets.

It also divested itself of

jurisdiction over Celsius and Wexpro.
Notwithstanding the Commission's statutory duty to
regulate all of the business of every public utility, and
therefore to regulate Mountain Fuel's oil and gas exploration
and development business, the Commission divested itself of
jurisdiction over sales of natural gas by Celsius to Mountain
Fuel.

And notwithstanding its statutory jurisdiction to hold

hearings and make determinations pursuant thereto, the
Commission approved a provision that arbitration is the sole
remedy for parties claiming default under the Stipulation and
Agreement.
The statutes of this state, not the Stipulation and
Agreement, must define the jurisdiction of the Commission,
but the Commission acquiesced in a serious encroachment on
its statutory power.
(b)

The Division, without legislative authority,

gave up its power to challenge actions of Mountain Fuel,
Wexpro or Celsius in violation of its duties to represent the
public interest before the Commission.
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(c)

The approval of the Stipulation and Agreement

violates the mandate of this Court.

While this Court

remanded the case for a hearing in accordance with principles
set forth in its opinion, the Commission failed to hold any
such hearing.
Corni~ission

Agreement.

The only evidentiary hearing held by the

was a hearing on approval of the Stipulation and
Nothing was done in accordance with the mandate.

The Conunission was told to classify assets as utility or
non-utility in accordance with a three-pronged test, but
there was never a hearing on classification.

The Commission

was told that any transfer of utility assets must be for fair
market value and in the public interest, but there was never
a reasoned determination of fair market value, and in fact
the Commission denied the Utah State Coalition of Senior
Citizens' motion for a valuation of the assets.

The

Commission violated this Court's mandate that the ratepayers
were entitled to have rates reduced by all oil prof its from
properties explored and developed at ratepayer risk.

While

this Court expressly stated that if a subsidiary were to
engage in oil and gas operations there must be a
determination by the Commission of whether Mountain Fuel
could divide its utility functions between itself and its
subsidiary, the Commission in approving the Stipulation and
Agreement allowed such a division without any such
determination.

All of those actions violated this Court's
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mandate.
An adminstrative agency has no power to ignore the
mandate of this Court, whether or not a case is settled.

In

fact, an administrative agency has a duty not only to carry
out the letter but to serve the purposes of this Court's
mandate, and the Commission by approving the Stipulation and
Agreement has frustrated virtually every purpose of this
Court's mandate.
(d)
Utah.

The Report and Order also violates the law of

In direct contravention of the law, the Commission

approved a sale of gas by Mountain Fuel's wholly-owned
subsidiary, Celsius, to Mountain Fuel at market prices rather
than cost of service.

To add insult to injury, that gas will

come from properties acquired and held in utility accounts.
In contravention of the law, Wexpro is entitled under the
Stipulation and Agreement to 46% of the net profits on oil
from new wells drilled in gas reservoirs.

In contravention

of the law, the Stipulation and Agreement lead immediately to
the end of Mountain Fuel's utility exploration and development program.
The Report and Order is the result of a compromise--plain and simple.

The shareholder interests were

unwilling to live with this Court's decision that oil and gas
exploration and development is a utility activity.

The

shareholder interests wanted an unregulated oil company and
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presented the Commission with a fait accompli that they would
not operate a regulated exploration and development company.
That fait accompli flouted this Court's decision.

To promote

their desire for an unregulated oil company, the shareholders
launched a massive litigative attack on this Court's
decision.

The Stipulation and Agreement were a compromise of

the Division's victory in the Wexpro case to avoid long and
expensive litigation.

The Commission, feeling itself "in a

box", approved the Stipulation and Agreement.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Public Service Commission, in

approving the Stipulation and Agreement, unlawfully divested
itself of its statutory jurisdiction:
(a)

in relinquishing jurisdiction over assets

which are as a matter of law utility assets;
(b}

in relinquishing jurisdiction over Wexpro

and Celsius, which are as a matter of law public
utilities; and
(c)

in relinquishing jurisdiction over sales

of natural gas f rorn Celsius to Mountain Fuel.
2.

Whether the Public Service Commission, in

approving the Stipulation and Agreement, unlawfully divested
itself of its statutory jurisdiction to determine whether the
public interest allows Mountain Fuel to divide its utility
function between itself and a subsidiary.
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3.

Whether the Public Service Cornmiss ion, in

approving the Stipulation and Agreement, unlawfully divested
itself of its statutory raternaking jurisdiction in allowing
an unregulated rate of return on production from utility
assets.

4.

Whether the Division unlawfully divested itself

of its statutory power to act as a party in litigation before
the Public Service Commission.
5.

Whether the approval of the Stipulation and

Agreement violates this Court's mandate in Committee of
Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 595 P.2d 871
(Utah 1979)
(a)

by failing to hold a hearing to classify

(b)

by failing to hold any hearing to deter-

assets;

mine whether the transfer of assets was in the public
interest and for fair market value;
(c)

by failing to determine whether it is in

the public interest for Mountain Fuel to divide its
utility function between itself and a subsidiary;
(d)

by failing to determine the benefits to

which ratepayers are entitled by having oil prof its
applied to reduce rates; and
(e)

by allowing Mountain Fuel to pay Celsius

market prices for natural gas;
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6.

Whether the Report and Order violates the law

of Utah:
(a}

by allowing Mountain Fuel to purchase gas

from a subsidiary at market prices;
(b)

Dy allowing Wexpro 46% of the net profits

on oil obtained from gas reservoirs;
(c)

by allowing Mountain Fuel to divide its

utility function between itself and its subsidiary
without a determination whether such division is in the
public interest; and
(d)

by depriving ratepayers of a reduction in

rates from the net proceeds from all hydrocarbons
obtained from utility properties.
7.

Whether the Report and Order is arbitrary and

capricious and internally inconsistent in approving the
Stipulation and Agreement despite the Commission's findings
that:
(a)

cost of service gas is an important con-

sideration to the public interest;
(b)

there are potential conflicts of interest

or sweetheart relationships between Mountain Fuel and
its oil subsidiaries;
(c)

exploration and development of energy

resources are appropriate utility activities; and
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(d)

non-utility activities should enhance

rather than jeopardize utility operations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

This Court's Decision And Mandate In The Wexpro Case

Rejected Mountain Fuel's Shareholders' Attempt To Create An
Unregulated Oil Company Because Of The Inseparability Of
Mountain Fuel's Oil Operations From Its Utility Exploration
And Development Program And Because The Ratepayers Bore The
Risk Of Mountain Fuel's Exploration For Oil And Gas.
The regulatory issues in this case arise out of
Mountain Fuel's exploration for oil and gas.

Utility "oil"

operations are by nature inseparable from natural gas operations.

595 P.2d at 874.

Discovery of oil in a utility

exploration and development program is not by design, but is
incidental to the exploration for gas.

What type of hydro-

carbons, if any, may be discovered is unknown prior to
drilling.

Until exploratory wells are drilled, it is not

possible to determine whether the ultimate production, if
any, will be oil or gas, or both.

595 P.2d at 879.

Mountain Fuel, at least since 1947, engaged in an
extensive exploration program for oil and gas.
(1947).

Case No. 2906

Mountain Fuel met the risk of oil and gas explora-

tion in a unique manner.

It maintained a utility account
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105 in which it held its unexplored or wildcat acreage.

That

acreage was deemed used and useful in the utility business
and was included as a capital asset in rate base.
at 875.

595 P.2d

The Commission traditionally allowed funds for

exploration and development to be charged to ratepayers as a
just and reasonable expense as part of the utility function
of Mountain Fuel.

Therefore, Mountain Fuel was allowed to

recover in rates costs for lease acquisition, lease maintenance (delayed rentals), non-productive well drilling (dry
hole exploration), abandoned leases, and other authorized
exploration expenses.

595 P.2d at 875.

When exploration was

successful, exploration costs were capitalized, MFS-8; when it
was unsuccessful, they were expensed, DIV-1; Tr. 687-88,
1026-27.

Mountain Fuel expensed all of the cost of unsuc-

cessful exploration in utility accounts for cancelled leases,
delayed rentals, other exploratory expenses and dry holes.
Between 1960 and 1977, $44,981,000 was authorized
by the Commission as a utility exploration expense, reflected
in rates and charges for the sale of natural gas.

595 P.2d

at 875.
Mountain Fuel's stockholders, prior to 1972, did
not stand any of the risk of exploring for "oil" and "gas."
Case Nos. 2906 (1947), 4797 (1960) and 6369 (1972). Mountain
Fuel's stockholders did not bear any cost of "oil" and "gas"
exploration until exploration resulted in the discovery
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of "oil" or "gas".

Id.

Mountain Fuel's stockholders' finan-

cial participation in "oil" and "gas" exploration prior to
1972 was limited to capitalizing the cost of successful "oil"
and "gas" wells.

Only when "oil" and "gas" exploration was

successful did the stockholders put up their money.

If

exploration was unsuccessful, the ratepayers put up the money
and bore all of the risk.

Case Nos. 2906 (1947), 4797 (1960)

and 6369 (1972); DIV-1; MFS-8; Tr.
2394.

312-14, 687-89, 691, 701,

Successful "gas" wells were capitalized in Mountain

Fuel's "utility" accounts and included in the ratepayers'
"cost of service."

Successful "oil" wells were transferred

and capitalized in the "non-utility" "oil" accounts and all
the income from production went to the stockholders.
Under the uncontroverted facts, until 1972, all of
the costs of exploration and development prior to the successful discovery of "oil" or "gas" were charged to Mountain
Fuel's "utility" accounts.

Mountain Fuel was allowed to pass

on every single cent it incurred in exploration and
development expense in its gas rates to the ratepayers.
Case Nos. 2906 (1947), 4797 (1960) and 6369 {1972); DIV-1;
MFS-8; Tr.

312-14, 687-89, 691, 701, 2394.

The ratepayers

thus assumed all of the risk of "oil" and "gas" exploration
and development during this period.
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The stockholders of Mountain Fuel, prior to 1972,
did not pay for one single dry hole.

Id.; R. 2711.

In 1972, for the first time, the Commission
required the Company's "oil operations" to pay $300,000 per
year toward Mountain Fuel's exploration and development
expense.

Case No. 6369 (1972); Tr.

688.

In 1974, the

Commission ordered Mountain Fuel's "oil" "non-utility"
accounts to pay 32.8 percent of Mountain Fuel's exploration
and development expense

~ase

No. 6668 (7/18/74).

Finally,

effective 1976, the Commission required the exploration and
development expense of Mountain Fuel to be divided equally
between its "utility" and "non-utility" accounts.

Case No.

7113 (12/1/75); Tr. 688-89.
Between 1966 and 1976 the utility expense
account (i.e., ratepayers) paid for 73.3 percent of dry hole
exploration and the non-utility account (i.e., shareholders)
paid 26.7 percent of this expense.

The utility expense

account paid 95 percent of the cancelled and delayed rentals
on leases and the non-utility account paid 5 percent of this
expense.

Of the total exploration expenses for the ten-year

period, $37,250,000 was paid from the utility account and
$8,222,000 was paid by the non-utility account.

595 P.2d at

875.
It is true Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" "oil"
operations did contribute from 1972 through 1976, under the
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orders of the Commission, approximately $8 million toward
Mountain Fuel's combined exploration and development expense,
DIV-1, but those funds came out of the enormous oil profits
already obtained by the shareholders.

The ratepayers in the

same period contributed over $17 million.

DIV-1.

In 1972,

Mountain Fuel's profit contribution from its "oil" operations
was over $1.6 million; in 1973, $2.3 million; in 1974, $7.2
million; in 1975, $14.4 million; and in 1976, $24 million.
SLC-1 at 8.

During this period of time, the profit from

Mountain Fuel's "oil" operations held in its "non-utility"
accounts for the sole benefit of Mountain Fuel's stockholders
amounted to over $47 million.

Id.

In short, during this period, the $8 million contribution that Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" accounts
or its stockholders made toward Mountain Fuel's exploration
risks was made out of the vast profits generated by Mountain
Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" operations that had been developed
at the risk of ratepayers.
The total risk, therefore, of Mountain Fuel's exploration and the development of its "non-utility" "oil" properties transferred to Wexpro was in economic reality borne
by Mountain Fuel's ratepayers.
Therefore this Court stated:
Thus, as early as 1957, the
traditional principles of utility law were
modified by the Commission, e.g., generally
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the investor supplies the risk capital and
sustains the losses in a speculative venture;
the ratepayer only pays a return on that
portion of the investment which is
found used and useful in rendering the utility
service.
Although the exploration and
development costs which were reflected in the
rates and charges were characterized as a just
and reasonable expense of the utility by the
Corrunission, these charges were, in effect, a
capital contribution to a speculative venture
for the purpose of developing oil and gas
sources.
595 P.2d at 876 (emphasis
added).
On January 14, 1974, the Commission indeed
found that the oil operations were so incidental to and
inseparable from the production and sale of natural gas as to
be a part of Mountain Fuel's utility operations.

The Corrunis-

sion ordered on that date that the investments, revenues and
expenses of the oil operations be included in the appropriate
utility accounts for ratemaking purposes.

While the Commis-

sion, in response to cries of financial ruin from Mountain
Fuel, later rescinded the order rolling in revenues, this
Court held that those findings "were not rejected."

The

January 14, 1974 Order caused Mountain Fuel to attempt to set
up Wexpro as an unregulated oil company.

Thus the essence of

what was before this Court in Committee of Consumer Services
was the shareholders' attempt to have an unregulated oil
company explore properties acquired, held, and developed at
the risk of the ratepayers of Utah.

In this Court's words:

These [January 14, 1974] findings, in
regard to the inseparable nature of the oil
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and gas operations, were the sword of Damocles
Mountain Fuel sought to have beaten into a
non-regulated oil derrick.
595
P.2d at 874.
This court rejected that attempt.

See Part E, infra, at

29-34.

B.

Prior To This Court's Decision In The Wexpro

Case Mountain Fuel Used Its Own System Of Property
Classification As A Test Of Jurisdiction And A Principle For
Allocation Of Benefits.
A central basis for this Court's decision that the
April 11, 1978 Order was defective was that the Commission
had allowed Mountain Fuel, in effect, to determine whether
assets were jurisdictionalized or not depending on Mountain
Fuel's own system of oil and gas classification.

This Court

stated:
Mountain Fuel, . • • developed a system of
classification based on custom or usage.
This
classification was never reduced to writing by
either the utility or the Commission.
If the
exploration and development produced a
successful well, it was classified as oil or
gas based on the "value of production." This
system involved measuring the product at the
well head or field separator facility, and
then comparing the field price of gas and oil.
Whichever substance had greater value
determined whether the site was a gas or an oil
well.
Thus, any disparity between gas and oil
prices at the time of classification could
play a decisive role in determining whether it
was a gas or an oil well.
If it were a gas
well, the drilling costs were capitalized and
the well was held in a utility account, and
any incidental gas and oil sales were
credited to a utility account.
If it were an
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oil well, the drilling costs were capitalized
and held in the non-utility account; any
associated gas was credited at field price to
the non-utility account.
In addition, any
acreage lo~ically related to the discovery was
transferred and capitalized in the
corresponding account.
595 P.2d at 876.
The Commission in the April 11, 1978 Order
based its jurisdictional determination on Mountain Fuel's
classification of its assets.

Id. at 877.

This of course

had the effect of nonjurisdictionalizing assets with
substantial gas reserves and giving Mountain Fuel's
shareholders a healthy unregulated return on oil production.
This Court noted the extreme importance of this
classification:
The classification of this property is
of utmost importance, since this property is
being transferred to Wexpro at a depreciated
book value of $33.l million. The claimed
gross revenue from this property for 1976 was
approximately $39 million. An expert from
Mountain Fuel estimated the fair market value
of the property at $150 million.
If, in fact,
after a hearing the property should be
classified as a utility asset, the ratepayers
by this transfer, would be deprived of
benefits to which they are entitled. Id. at
877.
This Court agreed with the petitioners that
there was no statutory or legal basis to determine the issue
of the Commission's jurisdiction in this manner.
The net effect of the Commission's
initial determination was that their
jurisdiction was based on Mountain Fuel's
classification. This classification, in turn,
was based on the value of production; and
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whether the substance was deemed gas or oil
was based upon the end use of the product.
There is no statutory or legal basis to
sustain such a classification.
Id.

c.

The Wexpro Transactions Previously Rejected By

This Court Involved An Attempt To Shield Mountain Fuel's
"Oil" Operations From Regulation; To Deprive The Commission
Of Jurisdiction Over Utility Assets; And To Appropriate All
Benefits From Oil Operations To The Shareholders.
The Wexpro transactions approved by the April 11,
1978 Order and then rejected by this Court were reflected in
four basic agreements between Mountain Fuel and Wexpro:

{l)

the original Agreement of Purchase and Sale (P&S Agreement)
dated December 21, 1976, MFS-1; (2) the original Joint
Exploration Agreement (JEA) of the same date, MFS-2; (3) the
proposed Amended Agreement of Purchase and Sale (Amended P&S
Agreement), MFS-4; and (4) the proposed Amended Joint
Exploration Agreement (funended JEA), MFS-5.
The P&S Agreement provided, effective January 1,
1977, {l) for the transfer of all properties held by Mountain
Fuel in its "non-utility" "oil" accounts to Wexpro at book
value in exchange for all of Wexpro's common stock; (2)
reserved all natural gas in the Dakota and Weber formations
of the Brady Field after "blow down" to Mountain Fuel, and in
effect transferred such reserves to Mountain Fuel's "utility"
accounts; and (3) gave Mountain Fuel the first right of
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refusal to purchase at market prices (a) all natural gas
produced from the "non-utility" "oil" properties transferred
by Mountain Fuel to Wexpro, and

(b) all natural gas dis-

covered and developed by Wexpro in an eight-state area for a
ten-year period.

MFS-1.

The JEA (1) granted Wexpro, effective January 1,
1977, the right jointly to explore with Mountain Fuel the 2.9
million wildcat acres of oil and gas leases held by Mountain
Fuel in its "utility" accounts (105 accounts), SLC-1 at 12;
Tr. 462-63, 588; (2) required Mountain Fuel and Wexpro to
share the cost of exploration of Mountain Fuel's acreage on a
equal basis with a joint annual

co~nitrnent

of $6,240,258.00;

(3) provided for a division of ownership of hydrocarbons
discovered under Mountain Fuel's "oil" and "gas" method of
classification on a well-by-well basis, MFS-2; Tr. 72, 455,
599; (4) provided that all "oil" wells and leases "logically
related" to such wells would be transferred to Wexpro; (5)
provided that on combination "oil" and "gas" wells that were
classified as "gas" wells, Wexpro would have a right to
purchase all "oil" at market prices from Mountain Fuel, and
on all combination wells that were classified as "oil" wells,
Mountain Fuel would have the right to purchase all "gas" from
Wexpro at market prices; and (6) provided Mountain Fuel could
farm out acreage under the JEA; but granted Wexpro the right

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to all "oil" production pursuant to any farm-out arrangement.
The fundamental change provided by the proposed
Amended P&S Agreement and the proposed Amended JEA was that
all gas produced from the properties transferred to Wexpro
and all gas discovered under the JEA would go to Mountain
Fuel at "cost of service" prices.

MFS-4 and 5; Tr. 68-69.

The proposed Amended JEA also provided that incidental "oil"
produced from a combination "gas" well would go to Wexpro at
"cost of service" prices.

The Amended P&S Agreement and

Amended JEA, for the first time in Mountain Fuel's history,
reduced Mountain Fuel's definition of "oil" and "gas" to
writing.

MFS-4 and 5; Tr. 286.
Under the JEA, Wexpro was granted the right jointly

to explore all of Mountain Fuel's oil and gas acreage.
134, 462-63, 588, 1521; SLC-1 at 12.

Tr.

All of the 2.9 million

acres were carried in Mountain Fuel's "utility" accounts.
MFS-5; Tr. 2085, 462-63, 588, 691-92, 701.

The initial costs

of this acreage were included as costs of property held for
future use and the ratepayers of Mountain Fuel paid a rate of
return on those costs.

Tr. 701.

Virtually all of the

exploration and development expense with regard to this
acreage had been paid by Mountain Fuel's "utility" accounts
and charged to the ratepayers.

Tr. 691-92, 2083.
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The right granted to Wexpro jointly to explore
this wildcat acreage unquestionably was very valuable.
During the hearings preceding this Court's decision, Mountain
Fuel's vice-president for exploration, Mr.

Cash,

testified

that the Rocky Moun ta in reg ion, the reg ion in which Moun ta in
Fuel's wildcat acreage was located, was the hottest onshore
area in the U.S. for oil and gas exploration, Tr.

439-441,

444, and "the competition for acreage and for exploration and
processing of acreage is extreme."

Tr. 439-40.

hearings, Dr. Bass confirmed Mr. Cash's judgment.
892.

Dr.

At the same
Tr. 886,

Bass testified that Mountain Fuel's wildcat

acreage was of great value, Tr.

892, and that the Amended

JEA was fundamentally unfair because Wexpro had done nothing

to earn the right to participate in its joint exploration.
Tr • 8 8 5 , 9 4 2 •

D.

The April 11, 1978 Report And Order Allowed The

Shareholders Their Unregulated Oil Company.
On April 11, 1978, the Commission issued a Report
and Order on Rehearing approving the
and the Amended JEA.

~nended

P&S Agreement

The Commission resolved "every

significant issue of fact and law in the proceeding."
4/11/78 at

~

Ord.

100.

The Commission ruled against the Division's
contentions (1) that the Commission had jurisdiction over the
oil and gas properties held in Mountain Fuel's "non-utility"
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accounts; (2) that such properties were utility properties;
and ( 3) that the proceeds from those properties should be
rolled into or included in Mountain Fuel's utility accounts
for raternaking purposes.
The Report and Order on Rehearing covered the
entire range of the controversy and adopted in total (and
verbatim) the positions of Mountain Fuel and Wexpro.

The

Commission reaffirmed the non-utility status of the oil
operations and its lack of jurisdiction over them.
,, 11.

Id. at

The Commission held that it would not indulge in

fund-tracing and that the origin of funds used for
exploration was not relevant to the validity of the program.
Id. at ,I 13.

The Commission also held that cost-of-service

gas was a sufficient return for inclusion of exploration
expense in the rate base, and that the shareholders should be
allowed an unregulated return from the oil-producing
properties.

Id. at

~l~I

16, 18, 26, 46.

The Conunission in the Report and Order on Rehearing
expressly rejected the theory proposed by the Division and
other protestants that any gain from operations should be
realized by those who bear the risk and therefore-gas rates
should be reduced by oil profits.
and 38.

Id. at

~

,~

30, 32

'

34, 35

The Commission expressly rejected the notion that a

utility bears a trust relationship toward its customers,
citing Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. New York
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Telephone Co., 271 U.S. 23 ( 1925).

Ord. 4/11/78 at

~[

37.

The Cormnission also expressly rejected the contention of the
Committee that the transfer of properties to Wexpro should be
for fair market value instead of depreciated book value.
at

,! ~[

Id.

8 2- 8 4 •
The Commission approved a provision in the Amended

Agreement of Purchase and Sale which allowed Wexpro to charge
Mountain Fuel market price rather than cost of service for
gas produced from acreage acquired by Wexpro other than
transferred acreage and that which came to it under the JEA.
Id.

a t , 104(2)(vii).
E.

595 P.2d at 875.

This Court's Decision And Mandate In The Wexpro Case

Held That Properties Explored And Developed With Ratepayer
Funds Are Utility Assets; Held That The Benefits From Such
Properties Must Be Allocated According To The Principle "Gain
Follows Risk," And Remanded The Case For A Hearing To
Classify The Assets And Give The Ratepayers Their Due.
Mountain Fuel itself explained to the Supreme Court
of the United States this Court's decision in the Wexpro
case.

According to Mountain Fuel, this Court held that the

"non-utility" oil properties transferred by Mountain Fuel to
Wexpro had always been and are utility assets, and that these
properties and the oil revenues generated therefrom should be
applied to reduce the cost of gas to the Utah utility customer.

Mountain Fuel Petition for Certiorari at 13.
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According to Mountain Fuel, this Court held that Mountain
Fuel stood in a trust relationship when it sold natural gas
to its utility customers, Mountain Fuel Petition for
Certiorari at 14; that sales of gas by Wexpro to Mountain
Fuel must be at cost-of-service prices for ratemaking
purposes; and that Wexpro is itself a public utility.
Mountain Fuel stated to the United States Supreme Court that
this Court's decision leaves "no room for Mountain Fuel or
Wexpro to conduct a non-utility business in oil and gas,
subject[s] Wexpro to Utah regulation as a public utility, and
require[s] Wexpro to sell gas to Mountain Fuel at cheap
prices."

Petition for Certiorari at 14.

Mountain Fuel's

characterization of the decision is correct.
Specifically, this Court held that the order
approving the Amended P&S Agreement and Amended JEA was
predicated on two erroneous conclusions:

the validity of

Mountain Fuel's classification system for determining utility
versus non-utility assets, and the conclusion that the
Commission had no jurisdiction over the "non-utility" assets
and the transfer of those assets to a non-utility corporate
entity.

This Court quoted with approval, as a key to the

defect in the Co~nission's order, the dissent of Commissioner
Rigtrup:
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I would conclude that the exoloration
acreage held by Mountain Fuel over the years
was used or useful in its natural gas utility
business, and should have always been
classified as utility assets. The fact that
revenues from ••oil" or other 1 iquid
hydrocarbons have become very significant
during the last few years does not change the
basic character of those assets. However, it
appears that the shareholders of Mountain Fuel
have come to expect an unregulated return from
oil properties, for which the risk capital was
largely derived in rates charged its customers
as ordered by the Commission • • • • 595 P.2d
at 873.
This Court held that the provisions under the
Amended P&S Agreement whereby Mountain Fuel would purchase at
market price, rather than cost-of-service price, the gas
discovered on properties acquired by Wexpro, violates the
no-profits-to-affiliates rule.

Id. at 875.

This Court held that by the activities performed by
Wexpro in joint activity with Mountain Fuel, particularly
upon the properties transferred by the P&S Agreement, Wexpro
itself becomes a public utility subject to the jurisdiction
and regulation of the Corrunission.

Wexpro is facilitating the

production of natural gas and delivering natural gas to its
parent, each of which constitutes Wexpro a public utility.
Id. at 878.
This Court held that the Amended JEA contained
"certain infirmities", since it allowed Mountain Fuel's
system of oil and gas classification to determine utility
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versus non-utility properties and the allocation of benefits
therefrom.

Id. at 879.
This Court reversed the Commission's Order

approving the transact ions and remanded for a "hearing in
accordance with the principles set forth" in its opinion.
Id.

at 873.
The principles in accordance with which the hearing

on remand was to be held were:
1.

Oil production facilities explored and

developed by a public utility in the search for hydrocarbons
with funds paid by ratepayers cannot be considered a separate
non-utility operation, but are incidental to natural gas
exploration and are a part of utility operations, and must be
treated and regarded as such for ratemaking and accounting
purposes.

Id. at 879.
2.

"There is

• posed the serious issue of

whether it is in the public interest for Mountain Fuel to
divide its utility function between it and a subsidiary." Id.
at 878, n.8.
3.

When the expenses to develop utility properties

are included in rate base, the ratepayers are entitled to
share in the benefit by having the net proceeds on the oil
and gas and other hydrocarbon substances sold by Mountain
Fuel to others applied to reduce the cost of gas.

Id. at

876.
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4.

It is the duty of a public utility to operate

in such a manner as to give the consumers the most favorable
rate reasonably possible, which stems from the trust
relationship the utility bears to its customers.

Id. at

874.

5.

Under the no-profits-to-affiliates rule, any

amount paid as a prof it by a utility to any other company
with which it is directly or indirectly in a control
relationship cannot properly be included in the rate base.
Id.
This Court required a hearing:
The order approving the amended purchase
and sale agreement must be reversed, and there
must be an evidentiary hearing. The
Commission must reassess the transfer and
determine whether the properties were utility
assets.
The following is the criteria by
which the properties should be classified:
(1) Was the property, while undeveloped,
held in the utility capital account (Account
#105), upon which a rate of return was paid by
the ratepayers?
(2) Were any funds from the utility
exploration and development expense accounts
(Accounts #795, #796, #797, and #798) applied
to the development of the acreage?
(3)
Has any natural gas or natural gas
liquids been produced from the acreage?
If the answer to any of these is in the
affirmative, the assets are utility property.
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Any transfer of a utility asset should be for
fair market value so an appropriate benefit
therefrom will redound to the credit of the
ratepayers.
Furthermore, before approving the
transfer of a utility asset, the Commission
should determine whether the transaction is
detrimental to the ratepayer, and whether it
is in the public interest.
595 P.2d at 878.
The record is uncontroverted that virtually
every property transferred to Wexpro was, and is, under the
tests, utility property.
F.

The Shareholder Interests, Unwilling To Live

With This Court's Decision, Decided Not To Operate Within The
Decision's Boundaries But Rather To Inform The Commission
They Would Not Operate A Regulated Oil And Gas Exploration
And Development Program; Presented The Commission With A
Deregulated Oil Company As A Fait Accompli; And Attacked This
Court's Decision In All Available Forums.
1.

The Fait Accompli.

There was never an evidentiary hearing to classify
assets, to reduce rates, or to determine whether the public
interest could or would be served by Mountain Fuel's ownership of an unregulated oil company.

After this Court's

decision and the denial of certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court, Wexpro explored the properties conveyed to it
under the P&S Agreement, and acted in all respects under the
P&S Agreement, as if this Court had not rendered its decision.

Stipulation ~ 1.14, R. 3548-49.

The JEA was can-
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celled, and further drilling on utility leases was done by
Wexpro first under an informal agreement and subsequently
under a stipulation filed in Case No. 81-057-04 and approved
by the Commission.

Mountain Fuel also discontinued all

exploration and development activities on the properties
subject to the JEA.

Stipulation ,I 1.16, R.

3549.

At the hearings on the Stipulation and Agreement,
Mountain Fuel's officers and shareholders stated the position
that:
Under the conditions as they exist under
the Supreme Court decision, and on the
properties that are involved • • • the company
is • • • not only unwilling, but probably
unable to continue exploring in the utility.
Testimony of Crawford, R. 1523.
The general feeling was someone in Utah did
something which was very bad for the investors
in Mountain Fuel.
Testimony of Harmon, R. 1265.
There was no one in Washington who stood up
and said "This is a horrendous decision that
has been reached for free enterprise and for
our national policy • • • " and I would say,
well it wasn't the commissioners doing it.
It
was the Supreme Court of Utah that made that
decision.
Id. at 1265-66.
[The company] felt the decision of the
Supreme Court was improper and totally
inconsistent with the practices that have been
carried on by the company throughout its
history.
Testimony of Crawford, R. 1525.
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Therefore, counsel for Mountain Fuel stated:
We are fully aware of what the Supreme Court
said about Wexpro and that is one of the
reasons we want this initial transfer of the
exploration program to go to Celsius. Wexpro
as the operator may or may not be regulated.
We'll just have to see what happens in the
future on that, but we want the exploration
part of the program as free of utility-type
regulation as is possible to get it.
That was
probably as important as any other single
element of anything we negotiated.
R. 1651.
The management of Mountain Fuel expressed to
the Commission in writing that it "cannot and will not, as a
regulated public utility in Utah, utilize retained earnings
or other shareholder monies for an exploration program" under
the circumstances facing the company.

Objection of Mountain

Fuel Supply Company to Division and Committee Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Injunction,
R. 2696 at 2701.

Mountain Fuel informed the Commission that

leases would be lost through expiration because it would not
explore for hydrocarbons.

Id. at 2700-01.

Mountain Fuel also informed the Commission that,
without seeking Commission approval, it was transferring
wildcat acreage to Celsius and that Celsius was willing to
commence drilling to prevent the lapsing of leases.
2698, 2702-03.

Id. at

If the assets were not transferred to

Celsius, Mountain Fuel stated, the leasehold interests would
expire.

Id. at 2703.

"Unless the wells are drilled on the

affected acreage by Celsius, under the jurisdiction of
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FERC, they will not be drilled at all and all interests will
be losers."

Id. at 2704.

Mountain Fuel took the position

that no damage would be sustained by any party pursuant to
this transfer, even though it acknowledged to the Commission
that any gas purchased by the utility from Celsius would be
at market price.

Id. at 2703.

At the hearing prior to the entry of the Stipulation and Agreement, Mountain Fuel's counsel, rather than
petition the Commission, simply told the Commission that
Mountain Fuel was not going to continue with an exploration
program on any properties transferred back to Mountain Fuel
under the Supreme Court opinion.

R. 30, 116, 1053-54.

Mountain Fuel took the position that participation by the
ratepayers in an exploration and development program with
management was "impossible."

R. 984.

A Mountain Fuel shareholder testified that Mountain
Fuel shareholders were not interested in a regulated
exploration and development program.

Testimony of Harmon, R.

1211-12.
Put simply, the utility interests made it crystal
clear to the Commission that their exploration for hydrocarbons would not be regulated by the Commission under any
circumstances.
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2.

The Shareholder Interests' Litigative Attack On

This Court's Decision.
The shareholder interests "mounted an extraordinary
attack on the determination of [this] Court" in three
separate forums: before the Commission, before the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, and before
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), in an
attempt to continue to litigate the Wexpro case, a case which
it had already lost.

Petition for the Establishment of a

Fund for Attorneys' and Expert Witness Fees for the Division
of Public Utilities, R. 2506 at 2507.
(a)

The FERC Applications.

Mountain Fuel and Wexpro filed a Joint Application
for Abandonment and Accounting Authorization and for Acquisition and Certificate and Sales Authorization by Celsius
Energy Company, In the Matter of Mountain Fuel Supply
Company, Wexpro Company, Celsius Energy Company, before the
FERC.

R. 2506.
Mountain Fuel and Mountain Fuel Resources filed a

Joint Application for the Issuance of Authorizations,
pursuant to Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, for (1) the
Abandonment of Certain Interstate Transmission Facilities,
Gas Purchase Agreements, Sales, and Service by Mountain Fuel
Supply Company, and (2) the Acquisition, Operation and
Continuation of such by Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc., In the
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Matter of Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Mountain Fuel
Resources, Inc., before the FERC.

R. 2506-7.

Mountain Fuel attempted to obtain FERC approval of
a transfer of the exploratory leaseholds held in its 105
account--its wildcat acreage--to Celsius, even though this
Court had required that any transfer of utility assets should
be determined by the Commission after a hearing on
whether the transfer is for fair market value and in the
public interest.

The property sought to be transferred to

Celsius was, as a matter of law, utility property under the
tests announced by this Court.

Mountain Fuel did not inform

the Commission or the Division of the FERC applications.
Rather, staff of the Division in attendance at a meeting
between Mountain Fuel and FERC gained knowledge that
agreements were being prepared to transfer utility leaseholds
to Celsius.

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for

Preliminary Injunction, R. 2622-26.

The Division moved for a

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
Case No. 76-057-14, to restrain the transfer of 105 account
leaseholds to Celsius.

Id.

The Commission denied the

Division's motion in 76-057-14, but established the 81-057-04
docket, and entered the motion for temporary restraining
order in the new docket.

R. 2794-95.

The Division took the

position that Mountain Fuel's applications before FERC were
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an attempt by Mountain Fuel to avoid
continued cost of service pricing for its
oroduced gas [and] an attempt to avoid giving
the Company's ratepayers proper credit for
their contribution to the Company's producing
oil properties, as required by the Utah
Supreme Court.
Motion of Utah State Division of Public Utilities and
Utah State Committee of Consumer Services to Dismiss Applications, R. 2709 at 2710.

As the Division informed FERC, by

the applications
Mountain Fuel now invites [FERC] to
relitigate these issues, in hopes of setting
aside the result of the Utah Supreme Court's
opinion and the policy embodied in the Utah
Commission's 1974 Report and Order.
Id. at
2716.
In short, the FERC application and Mountain
Fuel's failure to apply to the Commission for permission to
transfer properties to Celsius were attempts to divest the
Commission of jurisdiction over the properties and to obtain
market prices on the gas developed from those properties.
(b)

Mountain Fuel Supply Company, et al.

v.

Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., Civil No.
C-80-0710-J, In The United States District Court For The
District Of Utah, Central Division.
In this action, Mountain Fuel and the shareholder
interests sought declaratory and injunctive relief under
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various provisions of the federal constitution and federal
statutes, claiming that regulation of Mountain Fuel's
non-utility properties would violate its constitutional
rights, all of which issues had been previously litigated and
foreclosed.
(c)

Mountain Fuel's Opposition to the Fund

for Attorneys' and Expert Witness Fees.
The effect of the actions in federal district
court, FERC and before the Public Service Commission, and the
use by Mountain Fuel and Wexpro of four major law firms and
in-house legal counsel, spread the issues in the Wexpro case
across multiple forums and stretched the Division
representation thin.

See, Reply of the Division of Public

Utilities and Committee of Consumer Services to Mountain Fuel
and Wexpro Objection to Motion for Continuance, R. 2858-60;
see also, Motion for Continuance of Hearing and Time for
Filing of Prefiled Testimony, R. 2836 at 2837-38.
Mountain Fuels's litigation strategy led the Division to petition the Commission to establish a fund for
attorneys' and expert witness fees, as necessary so that the
Commission could exercise its power and jurisdiction and to
secure compliance with Utah statutes because of the attack on
this Court's determination.

The Division noted that, even
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should the federal court and FERC actions be dismissed summarily, the three-front war launched by Mountain Fuel would
involve an enormous amount of expense, and noted the irony
that Mountain Fuel was incurring enormous fees and costs and
charging them off to ratepayers, while the ratepayer
interests were in severe danger of being unrepresented.
Petition for the Establishment of a Fund for Attorneys' and
Expert Witness Fees for the Division of Public Utilities.

R.

2506-09.

Mountain Fuel not only opposed the fund for
attorneys' fees, but based on purported Commission contacts
with legislators concerning appropriations for the Wexpro
litigation, moved to disqualify the Commission from adjudicating the Motion.
G.

The Positions Taken By The Shareholder

Interests Before The Commission On Remand Contradicted Their
Positions Before The United States Supreme Court.
On remand, in a complete turn about from the
positions taken before the United States Supreme Court as to
the meaning of this Court's decision, the shareholder
interests took some extraordinary positions before the
Commission.

The Utility Shareholders Association of Utah

(Shareholders Association), an organization funded by the
utilities of this state, R. 4345, noted that this Court's
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decision "is viewed by the petitioner as adversely affecting
vested interests of shareholders acquired in reliance upon
past Commission actions," Application to Intervene, R. 2129
at 2133.

It in effect urged the Commission to ignore this

Court 1 s opinion.

It urged the Commission to "give

recognition to the long standing separation of the utility
and non-utility functions of the Company upon which the
shareholders have relied."

Id. at 2132.

The Shareholders Association expressly asked the
Corrunission to ignore the Court's decision that gain follows
risk and to reaffirm in effect the findings and conclusions
in the April 11, 1978 Report and Order rejected by this
Court.

The Shareholders Association asked the Commission to

recognize
that customers pay for service, not for the
property used to render it, so as to avoid an
unconstitutional taking of the shareholders'
property rights.
Id. at 2135.

The Shareholders Association further

ignored this Court's express determination that its decision
did nothing unconstitutional, by asking the Commission to
"recognize its responsibilities to the Company's existing
investors not to confiscate properties squarely acquired by
non-utility operations by their own funds."

Id.

(emphasis

added).
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Mountain Fuel also attempted to litigate the issue
whether the Corrunission's enforcement of this Court's mandate
would involve an unconstitutional taking of property from
Mountain Fuel and its shareholders, Objection to Order on
Prehearing Conference, R. 2194-95, and Wexpro took the same
position.

Id. at 2196-97.

Mountain Fuel, attempting to

convince the Commission that a number of "comments" by this
Court are dicta, seemingly flip-flopped the hierarchy between
this Court and the Commission:
All of the functions of regulating a
public utility are vested by statute in this
Conunission--not the Court.
We are not urging the Corrnnission to
undertake to overrule the Utah Supreme Court
on any issue, but we do urge the Commission
to assert its primary authority to make the
judgment decisions and to in effect regulate
where the issue has not been foreclosed by the
Court.
Memorandum of Mountain Fuel Supply Company in Support of
Objection to Prehearing Order, R. 2237 at 2245-46.
Notwithstanding Mountain Fuel's statement to the
United States Supreme Court that "nothing remained to be done
except the implementation of the judgment by the Utah
utilities corrunission," Mountain Fuel Petition for Certiorari,
at 17, n.7, and that "the federal questions have been
resolved with finality,

the regulation and taking are certain

and all that remains is an accounting proceeding," Id. at
17-18, n.7, Mountain Fuel informed the Corrunission on remand
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that there were many issues to be decided.

Memorandum of

Mountain Fuel, supra.
The Shareholders Association urged the Commission
to "exercise the discretion and latitude implicit in the
opinion of the Supreme Court."

Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Prehearing Conference,
R. 2330 at 2338, and itself went on to reargue all of the
issues already foreclosed by this Court's decision.

The

Shareholders Association went so far as to tell the
Commission:
While it is important to consider the
advice and philosophies set forth in the
Supreme Court's opinion on whether any
transferred assets should be transferred at
fair market value, the Commission must
recognize that it is only after a full hearing
as mandated by the Supreme Court that any such
determination of what is in _the public
interest can in fact be made.
Id. at
2337-38.
In short, the Commission was urged by the
shareholder interests to ignore this Court's opinion, and to
"sustain [the Commission's rulings] that the beneficial
interest in those assets that have traditionally been
classified as non-utility assets must continue to be
unregulated property."

Id.

at 2343.
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H.

The Agreement And Stipulation Violate This Court's

Decision And Mandate.
1.

The Agreement
(a)

The Property Transferred to Wexpro and

Celsius.
The Agreement, R. 3575,

effect~ates

the retention

by Wexpro of Mountain Fuel's oil and gas properties
transferred to Wexpro under the Amended P&S Agreement.

The

Agreement expressly supersedes and terminates the P&S
Agreement and recognizes that the properties subject to the
Agreement which were transferred from Mountain Fuel to Wexpro
under the P&S Agreement "have been held, operated and owned
by Wexpro since the effective date of [The P&S] Agreement,"
and will be and remain the sole and exclusive property of
Wexpro.

Agreement,

,1,1

VII-2, VII-3.

Mountain Fuel's and the

Commission's total disregard of this Court's reversal of the
April 11, 1978 order approving the P&S Agreement is thus
perpetuated.
The Agreement also provides for the transfer to
Celsius of all Mountain Fuel's wildcat acreage held in
utility account 105, formerly the subject of the JEA.
The Agreement thus went beyond transferring the
properties the shareholders obtained under the Amended P&S
Agreement and Amended JEA rejected by this Court.

For not

only does this Agreement perpetuate the infirmities of the
P&S Agreement, but it goes on to transfer with few exceptions
virtually all of the utility's oil and gas properties to
wholly-owned subsidiaries, Wexpro and Celsius.
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First, properties already deemed by the Agreement
to be in Wexpro's possession pursuant to the P&S Agreement
are under the Agreement to remain Wexpro's sole and exclusive
property and all oil, natural gas liquids and natural gas
produced from such properties are the property of and to be
sold or otherwise disposed of by Wexpro.

Agreement

. , II-1 to II-3.2
Second, Mountain Fuel transfers to Wexpro all
101 and 105 account leaseholds and operating rights held by
Mountain Fuel and accounted for in its utility gas plant
(101) account as of July 31, 1981, subject to a retention by
Mountain Fuel of the ownership of oil, natural gas liquids
and other minerals produced from "productive gas reservoirs"
underlying those leaseholds.

Agreement

,I

III.

Productive

gas reservoirs are reservoirs classified as such under Mountain Fuel's rejected system of classification.

These account

101 properties transferred to Wexpro are defined by the
Agreement itself as "gas plant owned and used by a utility
entity in its natural gas operations."

Agreement, ,

I-30.

Thus, except for hydrocarbons from productive gas reservoirs,
Mountain Fuel gives up its ownership of all hydrocarbons,

2wexpro's properties in ,! II of the Agreement are
referred to as "productive oil reservoirs" and "prior Wexpro
wells." These designations are based on Mountain Fuel's
classification system previously rejected by this Court.
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including gas, from gas plant used in Mountain Fuel's naturaJ
gas operations.

While "prior company wells" and

hydrocarbon~

produced from "productive gas reservoirs" remain the

propert~

of Mountain Fuel, everything else goes to Wexpro; and to add
insult to injury, 46% of the net profits from any oil from
commercial wells completed after July 31, 1981 in productive
gas reservoirs is to be shared by Wexpro, according to a
formula to be described below.

Agreement tt III-3, III-9.

Third, Mountain Fuel transfers to Celsius all its
valuable wildcat acreage.

Agreement, t IV.

Even under the

Amended JEA, found infirm by this Court, Mountain Fuel
continued to hold the wildcat acreage as gas plant used and
useful in its utility 105 account.

The Agreement, however,

transfers all this wildcat acreage to Celsius.

This valuable

wildcat acreage is now transferred from utility accounts to
an independent hydrocarbon exploration subsidiary free of
Commission regulation.
All of the properties transferred above would by
the very definitions in the Agreement be utility properties
under the three tests enunciated by this Court.

Yet no

hearing was held to classify them and no attempt was made,
despite a motion by the Coalition of Senior Citizens, to
determine their fair market value.
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Fourth, the Agreement transfers to Wexpro or
Celsius certain properties acquired by Wexpro after the P&S
Agreement was executed from sources the Agreement states are
independent from Mountain Fuel.

Agreement

~

v.

In the

initial stage of the post-remand proceedings, a dispute arose
as to whether these "after-acquired properties" would be
classified as utility or non-utility, with the Division
taking the position that they were utility assets.

Utah

Department of Business Regulation, Division of Public
Utilities' Hearing Brief on Remand, R. 2482 at 2487-88.

Yet,

the Agreement transfers those properties to Wexpro without
any decision on classification.
Fifth, the Agreement transfers "non-utility"
properties said by the Agreement never to have been in
utility accounts.
(b)

Allocation Of Benefits From The

Transferred Properties.
The allocation of benefits from the transferred
properties depends on the type of property transferred.
For example, the Agreement treats differently the
consideration given to the utility for productive oil
reservoirs and oil wells (P&S acreage) than it does the
consideration given the utility for the wildcat acreage.
Again, these different types of properties are defined by the
same classification system which this Court rejected as a
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principle of jurisdiction or allocation.

595 P.2d at

877-79.3
(1)

"Productive Oil Reservoirs" And

"Prior Wexpro Wells"
With respect to what the Agreement calls "productive oil reservoirs" and "prior Wexpro wells," all oil,
natural gas liquids and natural gas produced therefrom are to
be the property of Wexpro.

Agreement • II-3.

The proceeds

from the sale of oil and natural gas liquids are subject to a
"54-46" formula.

Agreement, ,, II-4.

This "54-46" formula subjects the proceeds to the
following provisions:

First, the proceeds are used to pay

Wexpro's costs and expenses of holding and operating prior
Wexpro wells and productive oil reservoirs. Agreement ,I II-4.
Second, after deduction of expenses and royalties, Wexpro is
then allowed to receive from the proceeds a return sufficient
to provide a return on Wexpro's investment allocated to oil
and natural gas liquids production.

Agreement ,I II-4(e).

The "base rate of return" is, for the first year of operation
16%, subject to certain adjustments.

Agreement ,

I-44.

3 Whether a reservoir is "oil" or "gas" is determined
in the Agreement by whether a well drilled in a reservoir was
held at the time of the Agreement by Mountain Fuel or Wexpro,
which is in turn determined by whether or not the P&S
Agreement had transferred that well based on Mountain Fuel's
classifiction system.
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so

For example, if development oil drilling is done into a
productive oil reservoir, the investment of Wexpro includes
the investment in any commercial well and the base rate of
return is set at R+5%, i.e., at least 21%.
~!

Agreement

I I-8 ( b) •

Out of any remaining Wexpro oil and natural gas
liquids, Mountain Fuel receives 54% of the net revenues to be
placed in an account used to reduce natural gas rates, and
Wexpro receives 46%.

Agreement '

II-4.

Natural gas produced by Wexpro from oil wells or
productive oil reservoirs is to be sold to the utility at
cost of service.

That cost of service price includes the

base rate of return plus certain adjustments, Agreement
~

I-44 and Exhibit "A", and the rate of return will be

unregulated by the Commission.
(2)

"Productive Gas Reservoirs" and

"Prior Company Wells"
While Mountain Fuel retains the ownership of oil,
natural gas liquids, natural gas and other minerals produced
from productive gas reservoirs underlying any leaseholds in
the 101 account, Agreement III-2(a),

Wexpro under the

Agreement owns all the operating rights and will be the
operator of all facilities related to such leaseholds.
Agreement

~!

III-2(b).

Proceeds from the sale of oil and

natural gas from Mountain Fuel's gas wells and productive gas
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reservoirs, as defined by Mountain Fuel, are accounted for as
utility revenues, Agreement

,!

III-3, with one critical

exception--i.e., any oil from commercial wells drilled after
July 31, 1981 in productive gas reservoirs will be sold by
Wexpro and Wexpro will receive revenues under the "54-46"
formula.

Agreement

irir

III-3, III-9.

Moreover, in

calculating Wexpro's proceeds on this "new oil" under the
"54-46" formula, the rate of return applied to Wexpro's
investment in development gas wells from which such oil is
produced entitles Wexpro to a "5% risk premium," Agreement
t III-9(c), or a rate of return of 21% in the first year, in

addition to its 46% of net revenues from "new oil".
Wexpro, as operator, will bill Mountain Fuel an
"operator service fee" in producing Mountain Fuel's
hydrocarbons from gas wells and productive gas reservoirs.
Agreement ,

III-5.

The Agreement does not provide that the

utility may bargain with third parties to obtain an operator,
but locks the utility into using Wexpro as the operator.
Billing will be on a cost-of-service basis, including a
return on investment for post-July 1981 facilities at the
base rate of return with an additional 8% rate of return (24%
in the first year) on investment in commercial development
wells.

Agreement

,!

III'7'5( c).

The rate of return to be

included in the service operator fee is set by the Agreement,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

52

Agreement ,I III-5{ c) and Exhibit "E", and will be unregulated
by the Commission.
Wexpro is required by the Agreement to spend or
invest at least $40 million for development drilling in
productive gas reservoirs.

Agreement

,I

III-8{c).

If

development gas wells become corrunercial, they will be
capitalized as Wexpro investment.

Wexpro is expected under

the Agreement to exercise prudent judgment "as if it were
owner of the productive gas reservoirs in determining the
desirability and necessity of development gas drilling • • • • "

Agreement

,I

III-8(a).

While Wexpro is committed

to invest at least $40 million in development gas drilling,
it receives two major benefits for this investment:

first,

it obtains its service operator fee with its rate of return
on investment in commercial development wells in productive
gas reservoirs; second, it receives 46% of the net profits
from "new oil" from productive gas reservoirs after deducting
its costs and expenses on drilling wells, and a healthy rate
of return on investment.
(3)

Exploratory Properties

All the leaseholds and operating rights with respect to the 1.4 million acres of wildcat acreage are transferred to Celsius4 under the Agreement.

All such acreage

4The Stipulation provides that Celsius rather than
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and unexplored formations underlying 101 account leaseholds transferred by the Agreement are to be explored by
Celsius.

Mountain Fuel retains a 7% overriding royalty

interest on all natural gas, oil and natural gas liquids produced from these "exploratory properties."5

The 7% over-

riding royalty continues until expiration or surrender of
the leases to which the overriding royalty is applicable.
Agreement

,!

IV.

The Agreement leaves open the possibility

that Celsius could trade leases so as to avoid the overriding
royalty and there is no safeguard established to prevent
reciprocal dealing which could avoid the 7% royalty.
Mountain Fuel has a 30-day call on any gas produced
from these exploratory properties, but at market prices
rather than cost-of-service prices.
The wildcat acreage is the same class of acreage tc
which the Amended JEA applied.

Under the Amended JEA,

Mountain Fuel would have obtained the gas produced from the
properties transferred to Wexpro and all gas discovered unde!

(4 cont'd)
Wexpro may receive properties under the Agreement,
Stipulation§ 17.4.
In fact, the wildcat acreage was all
transferred to Celsius. Testimony of Crawford, R. 1516.
5Exploratory properties are defined as "Formations
underlying Account 101/105 leaseholds or transferred leaseholds into which exploratory drilling is conducted • • • • "
Agreement, ,! I-29.
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the JEA at cost of service.

MFS-4, 5; Tr. 68-69.

Yet under

the Agreement Mountain Fuel's 30-day call on gas from
exploratory property is at market price.

Moreover, any

agency which disallows any portion of the market price in
rates does so at the risk of the utility's gas supply--the
Agreement provides that if any regulatory agency with
ratemaking jurisdiction over Mountain Fuel disallows in rates
any portion of the market price paid to Wexpro, the price
will be reduced to equal the amount that Mountain Fuel is
allowed to

re~over,

but Wexpro may then elect to be released

of its obligation to sell further gas subject to that price
reduction.

Agreement ,I IV-6 ( c).
(4)

"After-Acquired" Properties

With respect to the after-acquired properties,
Wexpro grants Mountain Fuel a 2.5% overriding royalty
interest on all production.

Agreement ' V-3.

It also grants

Mountain Fuel a 30-day call at market prices on the same
terms as the call on gas from exploratory properties.
(5)

$250,000 Per Year Credit

Wexpro agrees to pay Mountain Fuel $250,000 per
year for twelve consecutive years to be credited to its
utility account.

Agreement
(6)

,I

VIII-16.

$21,000,000 Reduction In Rates.

The Stipulation provides a temporary reduction in
the company's cost of service reflected in a reduction of
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retail distribution rates in the pre-tax sum of $21 million,
90% of which reduction applies to Utah customers.
Stipulation '
2.

3.3.10.
The Stipulation
(a}

The Stipulation Divests The Commission Of

Its Jurisdiction And Divests The Division Of Its
Statutory Powers.
The Stipulation, R. 3544, was executed by the
Division, the Conunittee, Mountain Fuel and Wexpro to resolve
all issues in all the above-captioned cases except the rate
design issue in Case No. 81-057-01.

Mountain Fuel and Wexpro

also entered into a similar stipulation with the staff of the
Wyoming Public Servtce Commission.

The Stipulation in part

calls for the parties to enter into the Agreement and be
bound by it.

Stipulation

,r

5.

The parties stipulate at paragraph 2.4 that Wexpro'
and Celsius will be independent hydrocarbon exploration and
development companies not subject to state public utility
regulation and which legally own and operate Mountain Fuel's
oil and gas properties.

Thus, the Stipulation, in direct

contravention of this Court's opinion, divests the Commission
of jurisdiction over Wexpro and Celsius.
The parties stipulate at paragraph 5.2 that the
Division and Committee will not challenge any action taken by
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Mountain Fuel, Wexpro or Celsius other than through arbitration procedures set forth in the Stipulation.
The Stipulation provides that in the event any
party claims default under the Stipulation or the Agreement,
arbitration will be the sole remedy.
decision of the arbitrators will

b~

Stipulation '

9.

The

binding upon the parties

except with respect to matters covered by Utah Code Ann.
§§

78-31-16 and 78-31-17, and other claims of improprieties

or irregularities in the arbitration proceedings.

Any form

of rescission is specifically excluded as a remedy in
arbitration.

The Division and Committee agree to make no

claim that Mountain Fuel or its customers have any right in
any property owned by Wexpro or Celsius except as provided in
the Stipulation and Agreement.

Stipulation ,I 11.1

The Division and Committee further agree not to
claim that any of Wexpro's or Celsius' properties are subject
to the public utility regulation of any state and agree to
cooperate to obtain legal rulings or statutes so providing.
Stipulation

~

11.2

The Stipulation provides that no party will assert
any claim to any reimbursement for any cost previously paid
by it to them.

No party will claim any entitlement to any

revenues previously received by others as a result of any
aspect of the exploration and development program, the
ownership or classification of the properties, or rates
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previously in effect, except as expressly provided in the
Stipulation and Agreement.

Stipulation ,! 13.

The Stipulation provides that no benefit or burden
created in the company, and ultimately its retail distribution customers, by the Stipulation or the Agreement" will be
used in any way as a basis for future rate relief to the
company except under exigent circumstances as otherwise
directed by the agency having jurisdiction." Stipulation
~

7.6.
The Stipulation strips the Commission of

jurisdiction over the natural gas sold by Celsius to Mountain
Fuel at market prices and nonjurisdictionalizes the 101 and
105 leaseholds.

It strips the Commission of jurisdiction to

regulate the rate of return on capital in the cost of service
for gas from productive oil reservoirs, and in the operator
service fee on gas from productive gas wells.

The

arbitration provision strips the Commission of its statutory
jurisdiction and powers.
The Division divests itself of its statutory powers
in agreeing not to challenge actions of Mountain Fuel, Wexpro
or Celsius other than through arbitration, in agreeing to
make no claim to any right in property transferred to Wexpro
or Celsius, and in agreeing not to file with any regulatory
body for modification of the Agreement.
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(b)

The Stipulation Flies In The Face Of The

Division's Successful Position Before The United States
Supreme Court.
The Stipulation states:

By reason of the Company's decision
not to conduct exploration activities as a
utility, in order to exploit the Properties
adequately, Wexpro must own the fee title or
be the lessee of record and must be the
operator of all the Properties. Stipulation
~I 1. 2 2.
The Division also stipulates that all issues are resolved
in Case No. 76-057-14 "in a manner consistent with the public
interest and in accordance with the holding of the Utah
Supreme Court in Committee of Consumer Services."
Stipulation • 13.1.

The Stipulation also provides that this

Court's decision was limited to jurisdictional grounds.
Stipulation '

13.

The Division and Committee in the Stipulation contradict the position they took before the United States
Supreme Court, a position which was successful.

That

position was that this Court's decision with regard to the
oil and gas properties held in Mountain Fuel's "non-utility"
accounts was (1) such properties were utility properties and
(2) such properties should be included in Mountain Fuel's
utility accounts for ratemaking purposes.

Brief of the

Division and Committee in Opposition to Mountain Fuel's
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Petition for Certiorari (Brief in Opposition), attached
hereto as Appendix "B", at 14.

The Division and

Committee also stated to the United States Supreme Court:
The bottom line of the Utah Supreme Court's
decision was that the net profits from
Mountain Fuel's oil properties beyond all
costs associated with their production,
including the cost of capital, should be
applied to the benefit of Utah ratepayers
through a reduction in their future
rates. • • •
The Supreme Court of Utah, in light of these
past practices, adopted a "no-profits-to-affiliates" rule which prohibited such
intra-company profits from being included in
consumer rates, and applied that rule to the
Mountain Fuel-Wexpro option so as to prevent
any prof it realized by Wexpro under that
option from being passed on to Mountain Fuel's
ratepayers. The Utah Supreme Court also held
that Wexpro, by reason of its relationship as
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mountain Fuel and
the unique relationship between Mountain Fuel
and Wexpro created under the Purchase and Sale
Agreement and the Joint Exploration Agreement,
was, under Utah law, a public utility.
Brief
in Opposition at 14-16.
I.

The Settling Parties Admitted The Stipulation

And Agreement Are Not Consistent With This Court's Decision.
Counsel for Mountain Fuel stated:
[I]t also frees this [exploration and
development] program that in the past has been
highly successful.
It's a program that I
don't bBlieve and the consultants that have
advised me don't believe and the company
doesn't believe that could be conducted under
the ground rules which the Supreme Court said
must apply for the future. R. 980.

* * *
Participation by the customer under the ground
rules of the Supreme Court opinion is in my
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opinion and in the opinion of management
impossible.
R. 984.

* * *
There is an enormous capital requirement [for
drilling] that we foresaw then and foresee now
being difficult to meet. We think we can do
it under the settlement agreement • • • and we
think we would have had some difficulty doing
so under the ground rules set forth by the
Utah Supreme Court.
R. 1032.

*

*

*

The [Utah Supreme Court] decision from the
standpoint of management was a disaster.
If
all of the fruits of the program had to be
rolled in, • • • the disaster was of such
dimensions to the shareholders of the company
that it felt it had to go forward with massive
litigation, and it did so. R. 2002-03.

J.

The Division Settled The Cases Because Of The

Expense And Time The Litigation Would Take And The "Threat"
FERC Would Deprive Ratepayers Of Cost-Of-Service Gas.
The Division expressed as the primary motivation
for settlement, not the settlement's compliance with this
Court's mandate or the public interest, but the expense and
time the litigation would take.

R. 974, 967.

To the

Division, the expense of the litigation was the "most
significant element" that motivated a negotiated settlement.
R. 1025-27.

See also, R. 1028-29.

Moreover, the Division

was extremely concerned with the "threat" posed by the FERC
applications which could cause the ratepayers to lose all
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cost-of-service gas R. 2055.6
K.

The Commission, Rather Than Carry Out The Court's

Mandate, Found Itself "In A Box" And Approved The Settlement.
The Report and Order approving the Stipulation and
Agreement is replete with express statements that the
Commission was concerned with the utility's refusal to
explore, its threat to have all gas priced at market through
its FERC applications, and the expense and time of the
litigation.
The Commission noted several critical regards in
which it found Mountain Fuel's conduct lacking.

The

Commission noted that "the decision by [Mountain Fuel] to
abandon exploration as a utility undertaking has been
implemented unilaterally and without Commission sanction."
Report and Order at 9.
The Commission expressly noted that the decision to
create Celsius was not brought before it, and that any such
proposal whereby Mountain Fuel would be allowed to earn an

6The Division's position that its concerns with the
loss of cost-of-service gas is the basis for the settlement
is puzzling in light of the Division's concession that in the
Agreement gas from all the wildcat acreage transferred to
Celsius will be purchased at market prices.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

62

unregulated rate of return on its "non-utility" investments
should be presented in advance.

Report and Order at 9.

With respect to Mountain Fuel's FERC applications,
the Conunission stated:
[The] Commission is extremely concerned that the Utah customers of MFS are
not well-served by the Federal Energy Regulatory Conunission's (FERC) taking jurisdiction
over any of MFS's operations and by MFS's
attempt to supplant State regulation with
Federal regulation and pricing policies which
could make natural gas significantly more
costly to Utah customers. The thrust of the
FERC applications has been to avoid Utah
policies favoring cost-of-service gas pricing
{rather than sharply rising "market" pricing
favored by the Federal Congress as an incentive for producers to search for new gas
supplies) on old as well as new gas. The
applications have evoked a classic, and
ironic, confrontation between company
interests seeking higher profits through an
expansion of federal regulation, and
regulators seeking to preserve State
prerogatives to regulate utility affairs in
the interest of keeping costs to customers as
low as practicable while allowing a reasonable
rate of return to investors. While the
Commission will not condition this order on
the withdrawal of MFS and its subsidiaries of
pending FERC applications, the Commission
feels a more appropriate procedure and a
showing of good faith by MFS and its
subsidiaries would be to voluntarily continue
said applications until the Commission has
been fully apprised of the effect of such
applications. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
In addition, the Commission expressly noted
that "the testimony of management and members of the board of
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directors is that MFS investors will not support a regulated
exploration program on these properties."

Id. at 13.

Yet, despite its express reservations, the
Commission approved the Report and Order.

In doing so, the

Commission stated:
Litigation has already cost the parties
substantial amounts in direct costs and has
involved proceedings in multiple agencies and
courts.
If the litigation, which to date has
cost a total of approximately $4,000,000, is
not resolved by settlement, it is possible
that it will proceed for several years in
several forums with costs to the parties of
additional millions of dollars.
Id. at 13.
One of the Commissioners noted during argument
that estimates of litigation costs in the future were in the
neighborhood of $7 million. R. 1423.
That the Commission was concerned with expense
and threats rather than with a thorough examination of the
issues is in part attested to by Finding 6 wherein the
Commission stated that:
The Commission is not entirely
persuaded that under attractive circumstances
investors will not support a regulated
exploration and development program, or that
such a program will cause problems with
partners in the field or with the ability of
MFS to keep employees. However, the
Conunission finds that it is unnecessary to
make a final determination on this matter for
the purpose of this proceeding.
Id. at 18.
The Commission had great concern about and expressed great frustration with Mountain Fuel's adamant
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refusal to agree to conduct any future utility exploration
and development, as evidenced by the following comments made
during closing argument on the Stipulation and Agreement:
COM. CAMERON: So if we start over and
we divide it up 80/20, or whatever figure you
want to say, and the ratepayer puts up its
fair share under an order up to a certain
amount of money, the company goes out and
apportions whatever it does, I don't
understand for the life of me why the company
is going to do a worse job than they would if
all the money came from stockholders, number
one.
Number two, I can't understand if this
Commission is willing after hearing about it
to go ahead and authorize such a program why
it would be in the company's interest not to
pursue that.
R. 2010-11.
After an interplay with counsel, Commissioner Cameron
went on to indicate the impact that the fait accompli and
threats by the shareholder interests had:
COM. CAMERON:
I frankly am not
worried too much about these properties or the
stipulation insofar as it treats these
properties.
I think that's been covered.
I
think I can make a decision based on that.
I'm worried about and have concern about an
attitude by the management of Mountain Fuel
• • • but I am very concerned about that
management absolutely throwing down the
gauntlet to this Commission saying we are not
doing that, we won't, this is the only way
we'll look at this, you know, and it seems to
be nonsense.
They're going to have to go out
and raise the money somewhere in the future
and it just seems nonsense. R. 2011-12
(emphasis added).
Commissioner Cameron later in the same hearing stated:
COM. CAMERON: That's my basic
question, is that what we're addressing, just
these properties? You know, I seem to think
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and it seems to me every statement that 1 s been
made here is the Corrunission accept this,
you've made your bed and it isn't going to get
changed, and I agree you don't expect--you
know, the law is the law and jurisdiction is
jurisdiction and all that gobbledygook, but
we're trying to be, or, we're being put into a
box which we can't get out of either. R. 2018
(emphasis added).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DIVESTING ITSELF
OF JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC UTILITIES
AND PUBLIC UTILITY PROPERTIES.

Fundamentally, the Stipulation and Agreement
divests the Commission of jurisdiction.

It sanctions the

deregulation of at least three classes of assets which are as
a matter of law utility properties: (1) the properties
transferred by the P&S Agreement to Wexpro, virtually all of
which originally were in the utility capital account; (2)
leaseholds in the utility 101 account containing productive
gas reservoirs; and (3) the assets transferred to Celsius
from the utility 105 account.

Notwithstanding this Court's

holding that these types of properties are utility
properties, all of these properties are, under the Report and
Order, immune from regulation.

Moreover, the Stipulation

seeks to assure this divestiture of jurisdiction over the
properties by stating that:
None of the parties will claim that the
Properties owned by Wexpro are subject to the
public utility regulation of any state, and
all parties will cooperate to obtain legal
rulings and, if necessary, statutes so
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providing.
It is acknowledged that the
Company's rights with respect to the
Properties or benefits from them may be
subject to appropriate regulation for
ratemaking purposes. However, that fact will
in no way be claimed by any party as a basis
for state public utility regulation of Wexpro
in any of its activities with respect to the
Properties.
If Wexpro's activities with
respect to the Properties are claimed by the
parties to be or are successfuly subjected to
state public utility regulation, Wexpro will
be released from its obligations under the
Agreement with respect to the Properties which
subject it to regulation.
Stipulation, t 11.2
Not only does the Report and Order divest the
Commission of jurisdiction over utility properties, but it
approves the Stipulation that Wexpro and Celsius will be
outside the Conunission's jurisdiction and not subject to
public utility regulation.

This is absolutely at variance

with the statutes of this state and with this Court's
decision that by the activities performed by Wexpro it
becomes a public utility subject to the jurisdiction and
regulation of the Commission.

595 P.2d at 878.

Wexpro has

never ceased owning and operating the gas plant it obtained
by the unlawful P&S Agreement.

The activities which this

Court found made Wexpro a public utility do not change under
the Agreement.

Yet by approval of the Stipulation, the

Commission has in effect reversed this Court's determination
that Wexpro, as a matter of law, is a public utility.
Celsius, by engaging in the same types of activities which
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caused this Court to proclaim Wexpro a public utility, is
likewise as a matter of law a public utility under the terms
of the Agreement.

Yet the Commission acquiesces in the

plainly unlawful terms of the Stipulation and disclaims
jurisdiction over Celsius.
The Stipulation and Agreement go so far as to strip
the Conunission of jurisdiction over sales of natural gas by
Celsius to Mountain Fuel.

Plainly, the Commission has power

to regulate all of the business of every public utility. This
Court declared in the Wexpro case that oil and gas exploration is a utility business.

It also prohibited sales of gas

between affiliates at market prices because such sales were
violative of the no-prof its-to-affiliates rule.

Moreover,

the Commission has jurisdiction over any contract with
respect to any expenditure diverting directly or indirectly
the funds of any utility to any of its shareholders or to any
corporation in which they are interested, § 54-5-26, Utah
Code Ann.

Yet under the Stipulation approved by the Commis-

sion, the Corrunission will be unable to regulate purchases of
gas by Mountain Fuel from Celsius or the price at which such
gas is purchased--a price which could be of severe detriment
to ratepayers whether or not the full price paid is allowed
to be passed on in rates.
The Stipulation in effect divests the Commission of
the power to determine "the serious issue of whether it is in
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the public interest for Mountain Fuel to divide its utility
function between itself and a subsidiary."
n.8.

595 P.2d at 878,

Since the Stipulation will prevent any party from ever

challenging Wexpro's and Celsius' independence from
regulation, the Commission will be permanently barred from
determining that question, a question which, in light of
Mountain Fuel's decision to continue Wexpro's ownership of
the properties, should have been determined on remand.
The Commission divested itself of its ratemaking
jurisdiction by allowing the parties to fix in the Agreement
the rate of return in the operator service fee and cost of
service paid Wexpro for its operations on 101 properties.
Finally, the Stipulation does away with virtually
all of the hearing provisions under the Commission's grant of
statutory authority by providing that parties claiming
default under the Stipulation are limited solely to the
remedy of arbitration.
The statutes of this state, and not the Stipulation
and Agreement, must define the jurisdiction of the Commission.

See, §§ 54-1-2; 54-2-1(30); 54-4-1

54-4-26, u.c.A. 1953.

to 54-4-7;

Notwithstanding the several dis-

claimers in the Commission's Report and Order that the
Commission is not giving up any jurisdiction, there is no way
to square the Commission's wholesale divestiture of
jurisdiction with those disclaimers.
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II.

THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES DIVESTS
ITSELF OF THE STATUTORY POWERS TO ACT AS A
PARTY IN LITIGATION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.

During the pre-Supreme Court decision stage
of Case No. 76-057-14, this Court decided that the Division
was empowered to act as a party and represent the public
interest before the Corrunission.

The Report and Order divests

the Division of this power in several important respects.
The Division gives up its power to act before the
Commission, to litigate before the Commission, and agrees not
to challenge any action taken by Mountain Fuel, Wexpro or
Celsius in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, other
than through arbitration.

Stipulation

,r

5.2.

The

arbitration provision further hogties the Division in
monitoring performance under the Agreement by prohibiting the
Division from using professionals retained by the Division or
Committee within twelve months preceding the Agreement.

This

eliminates any expertise the Division's experts have obtained
over the last twelve months in these complex matters.
The Division agrees not to make any claims that the
utility or its customers have any right or interest in any
property owned by Wexpro or hereafter acquired by Wexpro
except as provided in the Stipulation and Agreement.

The

Division agrees not to claim that the properties owned by
Wexpro are subject to state public utility regulation.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

70

~

Stipulation

11.2.

The Division gives up its right to

claim certain Wexpro properties are subject to any company
interest.

Stipulation,

~

12.

The Division agrees not to

file with any regulatory body for the modification or
abrogation of any terms of the Stipulation and Agreement
except in exigent circumstances.

Stipulation,

~

15.4.

The legislature of this state is the only entity
with authority to limit the Department of Business Regulation's and the Division's powers.

Neither the Commission,

Mountain Fuel, Wexpro, Celsius, nor the Division itself has
any statutory authority to modify the Division's powers.

Yet

the Division did so in the Stipulation and Agreement.
III.

THE APPROVAL OF THE STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT WAS IN WHOLESALE VIOLATION OF THIS
COURT'S MANDATE IN CASE NO. 76-057-14.

The Order in Case No. 76-057-14 was reversed
and the matter was "remanded for a hearing in accordance with
the principles set forth in [this Court's] opinion."
P.2d at 873.

See, Part E. at pp. 29-34, supra.

595

This Court

expressly ordered that the Commission must reassess the
transfer and determine whether the properties were utility
assets in accordance with the tests set forth by this Court.
Any transfer was to be for fair market value, not detrimental
to ratepayers, and in the public interest.

Proceeds from oil

operations on utility properties were to offset rates.

If

Wexpro were to continue its operations, it was to be subject
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to regulation and the Commission was to decide if Mountain
Fuel could divide its utility operations with a subsidiary.
Nothing was done in accordance with the mandate.
There was never a hearing on classification.

There was neve1

a hearing on valuation of the assets or on whether the transfers were in the public interest.
tion of any of the assets.

There was never a valua-

There was merely a wholesale

release of utility assets from Commission jurisdiction, and
the only hearing was on the Stipulation and Agreement.
The Commission ignored and violated this Court's
express mandate that the ratepayers were entitled to have
rates reduced by all the oil profits from properties explored
and developed at the ratepayers' risk.

595 P.2d at 876.

Instead, the Commission approved a stipulation that the
Division and the Committee would not assert any claim to any
part of the revenues previously received or retained as a
result of the exploration and development program or the
ownership or classification of properties, except as provided
in the Stipulation and Agreement.

Stipulation,

~

13.

There

was never any hearing for the purpose of reducing rates to
the extent of the oil profits from utility properties.
In perhaps the most glaring and critical violation
of the mandate, the Report and Order allows Mountain Fuel's
shareholders to operate two unregulated oil companies as
wholly-owned subsidiaries.

Footnote 8 of this Court's
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decision forecloses such acquiescence by the Commission in
the shareholders' successful attempt to avoid regulation of
utility functions.

The failure to determine pursuant to this

Court's order the "serious issue" of whether Mountain Fuel
could, consistent with the public interest, divide its
utility oil and gas exploration and development function
between itself and a subsidiary, is unthinkable.
By their statements to the United States Supreme
Court, the stipulating parties are estopped to argue that the
Report and Order follow the mandate.
A lower tribunal or administrative agency is bound
to follow an order or mandate of this Court, Powerine Co.
Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 148 P.2d 807 (Utah 1944);

v.

~'

Ithaca College v. National Labor Relations Board, 623 F.2d
224 (2d Cir. 1980); City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Federal Power
Commission, 561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Vetter v. Wagner,
576 P.2d 979 (Ak. 1978); Tovrea v. Superior Court, 419 P.2d
79 (Ariz. 1966); and has no power or authority to deviate
from the mandate issued by this Court.

Briggs v.

Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304 (1948).

Once a higher

court issues its decree or mandate, an administrative agency
has no authority, by stipulation or otherwise, to circumscribe the power of that court to see that its mandate is
carried out.

No entity other than an appellate court which

issues the mandate has authority to alter or modify its man-
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date.

United States v. E.I. duPont deNernours and Co., 366

U.S. 316 (1961); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 386

u.s.

129 (1967).

An administrative agency may

not knuckle under to utility interests and settle litigation
in a manner inconsistent with an appellate court's mandate.
Id. at 141.
In Cascade Natural Gas, supra, the Supreme Court of
the United States set aside a consent decree which did not
comport with a Supreme Court mandate.

After the district

court issued a new decree on remand, the Supreme Court in
Utah Public Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
395

u.s.

464 (1969) vacated the lower court's decree a second

time as not in compliance with the mandate.

In Utah Public

Service Commission, the Court held that a decree of a lower
court must conform with the purpose of the mandate as well as
its letter.

Id. at 469.

The lower court may not simply do

"the best that might be" done without quite complying with
the mandate.

Id.

at 471.

And perhaps most pertinent to the issue before this
Court where the public interest is at stake, "the pinch on
private interests is not relevant" to fashioning a decree.
Id. at 472.
The Commission did not comply with the mandate of
this Court.

Nor did the Commission comply with this Court's

purpose in issuing the mandate.

This Court's purpose was to
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put a stop to a fundamental abdication by the Commission of
its statutory responsiblity to protect the public interest,
595 P.2d at 873, and prevent a "regulatory outrage" which
allowed the transfer to an unregulated company of well over
$150 million worth of assets discovered and developed with
funds provided by Utah ratepayers.

Id.

This Court's purpose

was to ensure that ratepayers obtain their rightful benefits
from the huge oil profits Mountain Fuel was expropriating for
its shareholders.

This Court's purpose was to prevent the

use of intracompany transactions to create an inf lated price
to be charged consumers.

Id. at 874-75.

The Stipulation and Agreement disserve those
purposes.

Assets discovered and developed with ratepayer

funds are transferred to unregulated companies.

The

shareholders have received Commission sanction for their
unregulated return from oil properties.

Ratepayers will pay

market prices to Celsius for gas from utility acreage.
Except for a one-time, temporary reduction in cost-of-service
gas, the ratepayers will not share in the benefits by having
the net proceeds from all oil reduce the cost of gas.

The

purpose of the mandate, as well as the letter, is dashed by
the Report and Order.
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IV.

THE REPORT AND ORDER APPROVING THE
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT VIOLATES THE
LAW OF UTAH AS EXPRESSED BY THIS COURT.

This Court in the Wexpro case put flesh on the
public interest standard administered by the Commission.
In several important respects, even aside from the violation
of the mandate, that standard is violated by the Report and
Order.

The sale of gas obtained from utility properties fron

Celsius to Mountain Fuel at market prices, and Wexpro's
entitlement to 46% of net profits on "new oil" from gas
reservoirs, violate the no-profits-to-affiliates

~ule.

The Report and Order, as a matter of law, violates
the trust relationship whereby Mountain Fuel has a duty to
provide the most favorable rates reasonably possible.
P.2d at 874.

595

There was substantial testimony that the market

price of gas over the coming years will increase sharply.
See, e.g., R. 1145-46.

The record is

uncontro~erted

that,

when the 101 account gas fields are depleted, cost-of-service
gas will no longer exist.

See,~.,

R. 1060.

The

Stipulation and Agreement means there will be no more
exploration and development of hydrocarbons by the utility.
These uncontroverted facts combine to mean--not cheap
gas--but very expensive gas in the future for Mountain Fuel's
ratepayers.
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The parties paid lip-service throughout the hearing
to the ratepayers' concern for maintaining cost-of-service
gas supplies.

For example, Mountain Fuel's counsel stated:

I think [the settlement agreement] will
give the customer the thing the customer ought
to be interested in and is, and that's the
maximum amount of gas at cost-of-service
prices and the best reserves that these
properties are able to provide.
R. 982-83.
Counsel for the Division and Committee echoed that "We
wanted above all to preserve cost-of-service gas to the
ratepayers of the State of Utah."

R. 1038.

See also, R.

1901, 1965, 2009, 2054-55 and 2080-83.
Despite this lip-service to cost-of-service gas,
the fact is that when the supplies of cost-of-service gas
available from the 101 account properties are exhausted,
Mountain Fuel will have no more cost-of-service gas.

The

uncontroverted evidence from the stipulating parties' own
witness establishes that the market price of gas will
increase dramatically during the 1980's.

R. 1145-46.

The

adverse impact on ratepayers may well be devastating.
For example, Mountain Fuel is producing currently
about 50 million Mcf of gas a year at an average cost of
service of about $1.00 an Mcf.

R. 1105.

In a very few

years, the same gas, if unregulated, might have a market
price of $5.00 an Mcf.

R. 1105.

Depleting and not replacing
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this amount of cost-of-service gas will ultimately cost
ratepayers a minimum of several hundred million dollars a
year in increased gas costs.

Testimony of Roseman,

R. 1105.

If the 105 account properties will ultimately produce gas in
amounts equal to that now being produced by Mountain Fuel
(i.e., 50 million Mcf a year) and Mountain Fuel buys that
gas, that gas will be charged to consumers at the then
prevailing market price (e.g., $5.00 an Mcf)

rather than at

the then prevailing cost-of-service (e.g., $2.00 an Mcf).
This means an additional charge of $150 million dollars a
year to the ratepayers.

Testimony of Roseman at R. 1145.

A California gas utility estimated the difference
to ratepayers between cost-of-service-gas and market-price
gas over the life of the production of reserves from similar
properties in the Rocky Mountain region; the utility
estimated that providing the gas at cost of service would
result in a "net savings of $543,000,000 from the market
price of the gas • • • "

R. 1814.

In other words, the Commission's approval of the
settlement agreement may well be a half billion dollar
mistake.

In any event, the failure to require

cost-of-service gas f rorn the 105 account properties clearly
is contrary to the public interest, is extremely detrimental
to rate payers, and is violative of the trust duty
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considerations enumerated by this Court in the Wexpro
opinion.

595 P.2d 874.
Finally, despite some conclusory evidence in the

record that the transfers were for fair market value, and
despite a stipulation by less than all the parties that the
transfers were for fair market value, there is no substantial
evidence in the record to support any such finding.

In fact,

a motion by the Coalition of Senior Citizens for valuation of
the assets was denied by the Commission.

Counsel for the

Committee stipulated that the 54% Mountain Fuel receives from
net proceeds from oil on productive gas reservoirs is not
fair market value.

R. 1377.

While there was testimony that

a 7% overriding royalty is fair market value in arm's length
transactions, there was no evidence that it was fair market
value for Celsius to give Mountain Fuel a 7% overriding
royalty interest but to charge market prices for gas from
those properties.

There is no reasoned explanation in the

record why 54% of net oil revenues beyond Wexpro's return on
investment constitutes fair market value with respect to
productive oil reservoirs, whereas a 7% overriding royalty
constitutes fair market value for extremely valuable wildcat
acreage.

Nor is there any evidence to support the difference

between requiring cost-of-service gas from explored
properties but allowing market-price gas from wildcat
properties.
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The record as a whole is devoid of substantial
evidence to make a finding that the properties were transferred for fair market value.

On the contrary, the record i:

clear, based on statements of witnesses and counsel for the
stipulating parties, that the Stipulation and Agreement was
the result not of reasoned determinations on issues, but of
compromise--pure and simple.
V.

THE REPORT AND ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS AND HOSTILE TO ITS FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS.
A.

The Report and Order is hostile to its own

findings and conclusions because while it states that
customers will benefit from cost-of-service gas, it

sanction~

the end of cost-of-service gas and the purchase by Mountain
Fuel from Celsius of market-price gas.

Four times in the

Report and Order the Commission emphasizes the importance of
cost-of-service gas.

Report and Order, at 10, 11, 15, 17.

Yet the Report and Order will lead to the end of cost-of-service gas because, when the 101 account gas fields are
depleted, all gas purchased by Mountain Fuel will be at market prices.

Even before those fields are depleted, all the

gas to be purchased by the utility from Celsius from wildcat
acreage and from unexplored formations under explored acreage
is to be purchased at market prices.
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B.

The Report and Order is hostile to its own

findings and conclusions because it leaves Wexpro and
Celsius unregulated.

The Commission states that the

no-profit-to-affiliates rule and potential conflicts of
interest or sweetheart relationships between Mountain Fuel
and its subsidiaries require continued and ongoing scrutiny
by the Commission of Mountain Fuel and its subsidiaries,
whether or not they are subject to a regulated rate of
return.

Id. at 8.

Yet the Report and Order allows Wexpro

and Celsius to be unregulated and in fact prevents the
Division from ever challenging that lack of regulation.
C.

The Report and Order is hostile to its findings

and conclusions because the Commission states that Mountain
Fuel should continue utility exploration and development.
The Report and Order states that exploration and deve1opment
of energy resources are an appropriate activity for Mountain
Fuel, both as part of its regulated activities and those
which are not regulated.

The Commission states it believes

that Mountain Fuel should continue utility exploration and
development in the future, and that the decision by Mountain
Fuel to abandon exploration as a utility "has been
implemented unilaterally and without Commission sanction."
Despite this express statement of the importance of Mountain
Fuel's utility exploration and development for hydrocarbons,
the Commission allows Wexpro and Celsius to go
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unregulated and "for the purpose of this settlement [The
Conunission] finds it unnecessary to determine if Mountain
Fuel's activities should include an exploration and
development program." Id. at 9.
D.

The Report and Order is internally inconsistent

because the Conunission on the one hand states that Mountain
Fuel's non-utility activities must enhance and not jeopardize
utility operations, Id. at 8, but, on the other hand, allows
Celsius to be an unregulated oil company and to sell gas from
utility property to Mountain Fuel at market prices.
E.

The Report and Order is arbitrary and capri-

cious in allowing Celsius to be an unregulated oil company
based not on an application by Celsius or Mountain Fuel, but
on the Conunission's "trust" that Mountain Fuel will make such
an application.
F.

Id. at 9.

The Report and Order is arbitrary and capri-

cious in that the Commission notes its "extreme concern with
the FERC applications," but fails to condition the approval
of the Stipulation and Agreement on withdrawal by Mountain
Fuel and its subsidiaries of those FERC applications, and
rather awaits a showing of "good faith" by Mountain Fuel and
its subsidiaries concerning those applications.
G.

Id. at 10.

The Report and Order is arbitrary and capri-

cious because the Commission accepts Mountain Fuel's fait
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accompli, but the Commission "is not entirely persuaded that
under attractive circumstances investors will not support a
regulated exploration and development program or that such a
program will cause problems with partners in the field or
with the ability of Mountain Fuel to keep employees."

Id.,

Finding 18.
In short, the Commission's Order is not supported
by its findings and is in fact hostile to them.

The

irreconcilability of findings and the Order is fatal.
~.,

See,

Parowan Pumpers Association v. Public Service

Commission, 586 P.2d 407 at 409 (Utah 1978).

Moreover, the

Commission's action is so unreasonable that it must be deemed
arbitrary and capricious and it must not be sustained.
~.,

See,

Williams v. Public Service Commission, 504 P.2d 34

(Utah 1972).
CONCLUSION
Much more is at stake here than the Commission's
failure to comply with this Court's mandate in this case,
however important this case is.

What is at stake here is the

very integrity of the judicial process and the maintenance in
the community of respect for this Court's decisions.

If

well-heeled interests perceive they can successfully avoid
this Court's decisions by waging all-out war on them, respect
for the law cannot be sustained.

If this Court allows lower

tribunals and administrative agencies to honor settlements
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which fly in the face of not just the law, but of an express
mandate, then this Court will encourage endless litigation
rather than the resolution of disputes.

The shareholders

interests' thus-far successful refusal to comply with this
Court's mandate is an affront to the integrity of the
Corrunission, of this Court and the law.

Reversal of the

Commission's Report and Order has import far beyond the
protection of the public interest in fair and equitable
utility regulation.

It has fundamental import to the

promotion of a fair and equitable legal system, and most
important to promoting respect for the law.
The Report and Order should be reversed and the
cases remanded with instructions to comply with the mandate
in the Wexpro case and the law.
DATED this b_*"aay of June, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 533-8383

By~LL.•
•GiJMANKIN
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WEXPRO COMPANY, and
ALEX OBLAD, I JAUOLD BURTON, auJ
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ReJ pundcJJIJ.
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. The pctitionc:rs, !\fountain Fuel Supply Companr, Wcx-
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OPINION BELOW
The opinmn of the Utah Supreme Court, Appeal No.
I 583j, has been reported at 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) an<l
a copy of the ~otme is attached as Appendix A. 1
JURISDICTION
From the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court on May to,
1979, timely petitions for rehearing were filed by petitioners
and denied without comment on July 18, 1979. The Utah
Supreme Court has stayed its remittitur of the case pending
disposition of this petition for certiorari. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

Whether Utah regulation and taxation of interstate production and sale of crude oil and natural gas, so severe
that the interstate commerce may be terminated, constitute
an impermissible interference with and burden upon interstate commerce.

II. Whether Utah regulation of the price of interstate natural
gas sales, whid1 sales are subject to comprehensive pricing regulations by Congress and the J~edcral Energy Regulatory Cumnussion, is preempted by federal regulation.
Ill. Whether Utah regulation of the ernnomic return to the

producer upon sales of oil in interstate commerce is preempted by rnmpreheusive price regulations of the United
States Department of Energy which produce, in accordI

Tlie advance sheets of the Pacific Reporter erro1u:ousl)' set forth
counsd appcaranrcs for the parties. Tlac Utah Puhlic Scn·i<c Commission was wi1ho111 .my legal w11111t·I 111 ,my lime before the Utah
Supreme Court to urge the validity and publk policy of its onler of
A\nil H, 1~:>7H. That assignment rnme<1ucntly fell on the petitioners.
A m, Calvin L. Rampton, Esq. was, at all times bc:low, counsel for
Wexpro Company.

j

am.:e with Congress' intention, a far higher cc.:o11unul
return.
IV. Whether Utah's rt:truactivc reclassification of oil and gas
properties as utility assets. which depresses their value by
tens of milJions of dollars, rnnstifutcs an uncompensated
taking of the property of shareholders and bu1H..Jholdcrs
contrary to their invc:stmcnt-b1tcked reliance upon a Utah
statute, its practical construction for over forty years, an<l
previous final adjudications that these same properties
were not utility assets.
CONSTJTUTJONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVJSIONS INVOLVED!

Article I. Section 8 of the Constitution.
Article VI of the Constitution.
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Fourteenth Amendment, Section I to the Constitution.
Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 J 7(b) ( 1976).
Emergency Petroleum Allo(abon Act, l) U.S.C. § § 75 l &:. 75.)
(1976).

l!nergy Policy and Comnvation Alt, I 5 U.S.C. §§ 757 &:. 760~
and 42 lJ.S.C. § 6201 ( 1976 & Supp. 1979).
Naturnl Gas Polity Act, I 'i ll.S.C. § 3301 ( 21) (Supp. 1979).
Utah Publi( Utilities Ad, Utah Code

A1111.

§ '>·1-2-1 ( 30)

'(1974).

STATEMENT OF THI'. CASE
I. The N11lme of the JJiJf'11le. This controversy nmcerns the

State of Utah's constitutional power to rc~ulatc interstate com-

2 Copies of the relevant portions of the constitutional and statutory
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merce in oil an<l gas, a commerce alrea<ly regulated by the
UniteJ States, and to do so by a retroactive reclassification

utility oil accounts pai<l a share of <lry hole expenses an pwportion to· their share of revenues an<l thereafter have paid

of non-utility oil and gas properties as utility assets. Issues

more than that proportion.

argued below included preemption by f ecleral regulation, un·
due burden on interstate commerce, and the taking of property
without just compensation.

This case arose in late 1976 when Mountain Fuel transferred its non-utility oil properties and operations to a wholly-

For almost 40 years, petitioner Mountain Fuel Supply
Company ("Mountain Fuel"), which operates a natural gas
distribution utility, has also conducted one of the most successful oil and gas exploration and development programs in the
lntermountain West. It has done so with the full knowledge
and express support of the Utah Public Service Commission
("Utilities Commission"). Gas found was placed in a utility
account and dedicated to the distribution utility at a cost-of.
service price far below the interstate and intrastate market

owned subsidiary, petitioner We~pro Company ( "Wexpro").
The Utilities Commission, af tcr exhaustive hearings, approved
the arrangements between Mountain Fuel and Wexpro after
modification, adhering to the position, relied upon by Mountain fuel's stockholders and bondholders, that the propertit:s
transferred were non-utility. That position was based upan the
Commission's long-standing construction of the pertinent Utah
statutes and specific fin<lings of fact in contested hearings
with respect to the properties.

price. Oil found was placed iu a non-utility account and sold
The Utah Supreme Court reversed.

at market price.

It fashioned a test

under which virtually all of the non-utility properties must be
The Utilities Commission rc,1uired this segregation into

reclassified as utility properties and the profits on Wexpro's

utility and non-utility accounts and, in a series of contested,

sales of oil and gas from Wyoming and other states must be

final, an<l unappcaled orders, has repeatedly held that the
oil properties, most of which arc in Wyoming and states other

subjected to Utah rcRuJation to subsidize yet lower rates to

than Utah, were non-utility and not subject to Utah regulation.

Utah natural gas ratepayers who already pay the lowest metropolitan area rates in the nation.

Every piece of property at issue here was "involved in one or
more hearings and was classified as a non-utility asset by a

Certain conscc1uc1Kes stemming from the new intcrpreL1tion of the Ut•1h statutes by the Utah court are undeniable an<l
were not controverted below.

final order.
The capital rnsts of joint exploration and development
for both oil and gas were financed by ~fountain Fuel's share-

First, shardwl<lcrs and bondholJcrs, who rdit:J upon prec

holders and by the sale of <lebt scrnritics. Portions of some

vious final orders of the Utilities Commission applring the

expenses (primarily for drilling that resulted in dry holes)

Utah statutes that the oil properties were not subject to regu·

,./ere allocated to the utilit}' accounts in a mauner approved

lation, have rctroadivdr lost tens of millions of dollars of

by the Utilities Commission.
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Second, the conversion of a high-risk, free market business into a high-risk, low-return utility operation means that
petitioners will almost certainly be forced to dose down. as
now unprofitable and impossible to finance, one of the nation·s most successful energy exploration and development
programs. The energy program which will be shut down is in
the lntermountain West, one of the most prolific on-shore
areas in the country for new discoveries of oil and gas.

jects it to publit: utility regulation in Utah and Wyoming,
while its production and transmission fum:tions are under federal and oth$!r state regulation. Mountain Fuel's independent,
non-utHity businesses indude the produt:tion an<l sale of oil
and the production of gas as well as the manufadure and sale
of brick, ceramics, and other building materials, none of which
has ever been subject to state utility regulation. Re: Mountain
fuel S11pply Co., 33 P.U.R. (N.S.) 3 (Utah 19·10); U1,1h P.S.C.
Ca1e No. 6369 ( 1972) (R. 5728, 5734-36); (R. 226, 3800

Third, Utah, a consuming state, has undertaken to regulate oil and gas production and sales in the producing states
of Wyoming. Colorado and other states, with the effect of
impeding interstate commerce.

(17])

Fourth, the price of interstate sales of gas, regulated nationally by Congress an<l the Federal Energy Regulatory Com·
mission, will now be fixed at lower levels by Utah in orJcr
to benefit local, Utah consumers.
Fifth, the return to the prnJUl:cr on interstate sales of
oil, controlled by price regulations of the United States De·
partment of Energy to encourage new production, will now be
greatly depressed by Utah in order to subsidi:le local natural
gas consumers.
The dispute between the parties concerns the constitu·
tional power of Utah to accomplish these results in the way

it did.
2. Origin

1'11111:1iom of i\lo11111,1i11 1'111:/. Mountain Fuel
was neatcd by a 1935 merger of five companies, one of whkh
produced oil. (R. 4394, 4945, 5512-13) For <lt.-ca<les, Moun1111d

3. 1'he b.:plor"1io11 ,md Der<,:lo/1mmt Prugr,mt. For many
years, the Company's utility and non-utility divisions rnrric<l
on a vigorous joint exploration and development program.
Mountain fuel investors have always borne the capital rnsts
of land acquisition for both utility and non-utility exploration.
(R. 4392) If the pro~ram produced a successful wdl, it wa~
classified as either oil or ~as, depending upon whirh l1:ad
the wcatcr "value of produrtion" at the wellhead. ( R. :j72 !H) If a gas fonnatiun was disrnvcred, all assodate<l rnsts
were rnpitaliled in the utility acrnunts and reflected in the
rates. In the event of an oil well discovery, the entire rnst
was rnpitali:tcd 111 the Company's non-utility oil al'rnunts a11d
was, therefore, not taken into account in establishing natural
gas rates. (R. 56L·1, 5706)
Dry holes, whid1 prw.lurc neither gas nor oil, arc rn:ccssarily treatc<l differently. In the early years, when most wells
were gas, dry hole expenses were prim:ipall)' reflected i11 the
utility accounts. Even then, the non-utilit)' oil division paid
a lar~cr proportion of drilling expense than its proportion ut
total Company oil :rnd ~as revenues. ( R. ; N2 [ 8), .1800 [ 2.j].

")72'.\) A~ oil hc:cum.· a sihnificrnt co11t1iLH1tor to Mou11ta111
(R. 4393-94)
Its
distribution
of
natural
gas
subFuel
its Library
shareServices
of joint cxplor.1tio11 expense rose •uiJ
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smcc 1975, has stouJ at half. U1,1h P.S.C. CuJc No. 7l l3
( 1975) ( R. 5817-18) The share allornteJ to the utility gas
acrnunts affects natural gas rates. The share paid by non-'
utility oil acrnunts docs not.

The Utilities Commission h.1s always rc:q11in:d Mountain
Fuel to scgrcg•1te non-utility oil properties from utility gas

properties an<l operations. The Commission furb,zde Mountain Fuel to inclu<le oil properties in the utility rate base upan
which an authoriied rate of return on plant was allowed. This
was done in seven separate rate orders from 1940 to 1978. 1
These seven proc.:ecdings were all contested and all went to
final orders from which no appeals were taken. During these
years the joint exploration and development program was carried on with the express approval of the Commission as to the
utility division's participation.
Mountain Fuel also has historiutll}' t.:onJuctcJ joinl ex·
ploration and development with other inJcpenJent producers
who, upon discovering gas, sold the gas at nurket price to
.Mountain Fuel in interstate rnmmen:c for delivery and cou-

fidd price of .$1.17 and a pipeline pncc of $l.-i8. (R. 50)1)
Mountain htd's gas transmission system, built 011ly bemuse

of its exploration and dcvdupmcnt program, <.:nablc:J the Company to purdmsc an aJJitional ouc trillion rnbic feet betweeu
1960-1976 (R. 3666), giving Mountaiu Fuel a reserve lift:
index of bctwceu J.1 anJ I) years, tompareJ with the 11•1tional
average of 11i11e years. (It 2030) In 1979, over jU percent of
Mountain ha<:l's utility gas rct.)ltjrcmcnts arc bejng supplieJ
from its own wells, a result unmatched by any other comparable gas Jistribution utility
In the period 1960-1976, rates were reduced .$ 123 million
by lower gas prices Jue to the exploration and Jcvelopme11t
program. (R. 2391) Rates wc:rc reJuced an aJJitional $93.8
million due tu tax deductions generated by the program ( R.
.1638), for a total bcndit to the ratepayers of .$216.8 million.
As a conS(.'(.)Ueau:c, f\lmmtaiu Fuel has the lowest metropolitan
area natural gas rates in the: nation. ( R. 389)

5. 1'be U,1fr/'".>'''I' JU1k 1.iwe The l ltah SuprenH.: Court latld

that Mountain Fuel's non-utility oil prnpc:rtics must be taken
to subsidize its utility ratepayers This holding was baseJ ou
4. U,11t:/'"Y",. Bem:fiu /mm /he l'ro,i:r,1111 . .Mountain Fuel has
the assumption that the ratepayers took the risks of the proalways found substantially more gas (better than l. 5 trillion
gram by payinA l'Crtain exploration expenses i11 their rates.
cubic feet between 19'>0· 1976) than oil. (R. )666, 'H>33, 56.16)
(App. A8-9) The court dtJirntc:J tltc oil prop<:rtics to the
Its cost-of-servkc £aS ( aLtuaf pro<ludion (()St plus a utility
ratep•1yers on this mo1H:y·at-risk 11ot1011. Although a misrate of return) has always been priced well below market.
nomer, "ratepayer contribution" to the program was much
In 1977, for example, Mountain Fuel customers paid $.40
smaller than shareholder contributiou. In the pcrioJ 1960per Mcf for Company cost-of-service gas as compared with a
1976, a rernver}' of $4·1-9 million was authorizc:d in the rates.
(R. 3638) In that same period, invc:stors contributeJ $87.7
) Ile: Mountain Fuel Supply Com11any, 33 P.U.fl. (N.S.) 3 (1940);
million to capital rnsts associated with utility gas exploratinll
Utah P.S.C. Case No. 3972 (1953) (H. 5502-03); Utah P.S.C. Case No.
4392 (1957) (R. 5621); Utah P.S.C. Case No. ·i797 (1960) (R. 5636);
(R. 3639) anJ $·12.9 million for costs associated with oil
5901 0968)
(H. S.J.
5706-07);
P.S.C.Funding
Case for
No.digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Utah P.S.C. Case No. Sponsored
by the
QuinneyUtub
Law Library.
(R. ">439), makinJ~ a total nmtribution of Sno.6 111illio11.
6369 0972) m. 5728); lltah P.S.C. Case No. Ci668 ( 197·1) (R. 5803).
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Investors thus rnutributeJ nearly three times as much as rate·
payers "contributed."

a major gathering network, compressor stations, a11d alJicJ

Moreover, whatever the comparative contributions of investor and ratepayer, the magnitude of the contributions had
nothing to Jo with risk. All of the investor contribution was
at risk while none of the so-called "ratepayer contribution"
was. (R. 2452, 2514-15, 2523, 2746) That is manifest from
the fact that the Utilities Commission ruled in three casesin 1960, 1968 and 1978 1-that it would allow a reasonable
exploration expense in the gas utility rates only so Jong as
the cost-of-service of developing new supplies of Company
production was lower than the average cost of purchased g••S.
The ratepayers could not lose; the shareholders anJ bondholders could.
Virtually all of the 11on-utility oil
properties transferred to Wexpro on January I, 1977, were
outside Utah, the principal producing properties being in
Wyoming, Colorado, and Nevada. (Sec Appendix C) All
of Wexpro's oil opcrntions and substantially all of Mountain Fuel's gas operations involve interstate rnmmcrcc. Crude
oil is sold in interstate commerce to refineries or other producers in mall)' states at prices subject to federal regulation.
(R. 970- 71) Natural gas sales at the wellhead, in intrastate
as well as interstate transactions, arc also subject to comprehensive federal regulation.
6. lnlenlule Co111111t'fd'.

Mountain Fuel has constructed an interstate transmission
.system from Colorado through Wyoming to Utah along with
.C

Utah P.S.C. Case No. 4191 (1960) m. 5639); Utah P.S.C. Case No.
5907 (1968) (R. 5663); Utala P.S.C. Case No. 16-051-H (1978) CR. 3393,

3395). In the 1968 case, the Utilities Commission said:
(Al vigorous exploration and development prog1·am should
be continued so long as the costs incurred in developing new
supplies of gas are lower lhan lhe average cost of purchased
gas.

(R. 5663)

capital facilities. These facilities are under federal regulatiou.
(R. 4HO) They are shown on Appendix D. Because of its
exploration and development program, Mountain Fuel was
able to supply. natural gas to northwestern, southwestt:rn and
midwestern consuming states <luring the harsh winter of 19761977. (R. 5504 [ 3])

7. Jm·eslor Reliullft.'. Capital contributions by investors for
both oil and gas were made in reliance upon the segregation
of the non-utility oil from the utility gas. ( R. 5149- 51) Shareholders pun:hascd Mountain Fuel stock, whid1 is traded 011
the New York Stock Exdrnngc, in reliance upon· the Utilit}'
Commission's rcpeatcJ final and unappcaled but contested decisions that the Company's uil properties arc unrc~lalated, 11011utility assets. Bondholders, as well, purchased in reliance upon
the non-utility rharndcr of the oil propcrtit:s. As a result, the
Company has raised debt c1pital at low costs to utilit}' ratepayers. U1,1h P.S.C. Cm: N<>. 711.3 (1975) (R. 5822)
8. for111,1lio11 ,md 'J'r,11JJ/n lo fr/ cx/1ru.

The non-utility oil
properties were transferred by Mountain Fu~I in return for
all outstanding Wexpro sttKk. (R. 346-47, 53·10) Wexpro
w&ts created to encourage anJ expand oil an<l gas cxploratil>11
;md development activities. The market value of the 11011utHity oil properties transf cm:J was estimated to be 111 exec~~
of $J 50 million, the entire cost of which had been paid b}'
shareholders from earnings or the sale of securities. No part
of these costs was ever rccovcreJ in utility rates. (R. ·1393,
4406)
Wexpm anJ Mountain Fuc:I 1tlso t:11tcrcJ jnto a 1977
Joint Exploration Agreement ("Jl'.A"), approv(.'d hy the Co111-
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h&tlf of annual exploration expenses, with Mountain Fuel capitalizing and receiving any gas discoveries and Wexpro capital-

pany (App. Bl7-18, 22, 39-·10) an<l that the program had been
in the public interest an<l should be continued in the future
under the JEA with Wt:xpro. (App. li.39-40, 85-86)

izing and receiving any oil discoveries. It was anticipated that
Wexpro would also explore and develop independently of
Mountain Fuel, raising its own capital to do so. (R. 250, 277)

11. U1,1h S11prt:11ll: Cu11r1 110/di11g. Upon Jirut appeal, the
Utah Supreme Court, in a <livi<leJ opinion, held that the nonutility oil properties haJ always been a11J arc utility assets,''
and that these properties anJ the oil rcvenucs generated from
them should be "applied, to reduce the rnst of gas" to the
Utah utility customer. (App. AB-9) The court majorit)' JiJ
not mention the separation of utilitr gas and non-utility oil
rcc1uired by the Commission for •tlmost ·iO y<:ars, or the seven
previous, scparntc f iual orders of the Commission <tdjuJicating
the oil properties of .Mountain Fuel to be non-utility, unregulated assets.

9. PuJition of lfrJjwwlmJJ. Respondents did not contend before the Utilities Commission that the non-utility assets should
be rolled into or merged with the utility gas accounts foe catemaking purposes. They expressly disclaimed that argument
and instead asked the Commission to attach certain conditions
to the Wexpro transfer. (R. 674, 3785-91) On appeal, respondents for the first time argued that the ratepayer should
receive, along with low-priced cost-of -service gas and high
reserves, all of the oil assets and prof its above a regulated
utility rate of return.
10. Utilitit·.r CommiHiou Holding. On April 11, 1978, the

Utilities Commission approved the JEA and found that nonutility oil properties transferred to \X'expro were not subject
to regulation. It cited the precedent of 38 years of final adjudications and orders of the Utilities Commission as to the
non-utility character of the oil assets and that an exploration
expense would be allowed in the rates only so long as the
costs of that program reflected in the rates were lower than
the average price of purchased gas., (App. Illl-15, 17-18,
28-30, 32, 35, 44)
Jt further found that Mountain Fuel shareholders and

The Utah Supreme Court majorjty Jid 11ot cite nor <liscuss
that portion of the Utah statute providing that regulation of
a utility by the Commission shaJI not extend to anr non-utility
business conduded by th(: utility. Utah CoJe Ann. § 54-2- l
(30) (1974). The rnurt helJ that the Commission's conclusions were "pren1ised on the erroneous assumption there was
no correlation or rnnnedion between the contributions by the
ratepayers. through an annual exploration and development
expense included in the rate base, and the ensuing benefits
from the program." (App. A2)

The Utah court wrote out a three-pronged economic test to determine whether the non-utility oil properties were utility assets, viz.,
(1) was the property, while undeveloped wildcat acreage, ever reflected, even momentarily, in a utility account earning a rate o(
return, (2) were any utility exploration expense funds applied to
develop that acreage or (3 I have natural gas or gas liquids ever been
produced from the acreage, regardless of amount. <App Al3-14)
Petitioners acknowledge that undt·r this new lest, :mLst;.rntially all of
s The Report and Order or the Utilities Commission of April 11, 1978
lhc
non-utility
oil properties
would fall within the sweeping contours
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Jgnoring the fact that the Commjssion had precisely recog·
nized that connectjoo and explained its relevance, the court
majority, on the basis of a new theory that Mountain 1:uel
stood in a "trust relationship" when it sold natural gas to its
utility customers (App. A4, 8), held that (i) sales of interstate gas by Wexpro to 1'.fountain Fuel must be at the cost-ofservice prke rather than the federal reiling price, even when
the gas rnmes from acreage independently developed by Wexpro (App. AS·6), and (ii) Wexpro. along with any other
company in interstate commerce that selJs jointly developed
gas to Mountain Fuel, is itself a public utility subject to Utah
regulation. The Utah court stated:

Justice Wilkins, in dissent, concluded that the majorit}'°s
ruling was contrary to the Utah statutc:s and to the many final
Jec.:isions of the UtiHtics Commission, that the Utah wurt
had ignored Jcdsions of this Court unJer the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that the detision constituteJ a "massive
appropriation of the property dghts of Mountain Fuel's shareholders." (A pp. A 52- 56) The dissent noted that the remand to the Utilities Commission woulJ be a mere methanical
accounting protedurc because the Commission had found fads
&llld the court majority haJ stated rnnclusions that re9uired
the redassification of the prnpcrties in ciucstion from 11011utility to utility. (App. A4 I-42, 53)

A review of the provisions of the two agreements

as moJifitd by the Commission dearly indicates that,
by the activities performed by Wexpro, it becomes a
public utility subject to the jurisdiction and regulation
of the Commission under Sec. 54-2-1 ( 30). )Y/ ex pro, by
i11 joint ,,aivitieJ 11•ilh Alo1111lai11 1"11e/, particularly upon the transferred properties iJ both performing '' ser·
11ice, z1iz., f,1cilitaJi11g the prod111:1io11 of 1111/ul'al ga.r,

1111d delivering 1U1tural gas lo ill f>111"C1JI, both of 11•hich
com1i1111e lf/expro a public u1i/i1y. (App. A13) (Em·
phasis added)
These concepts, taken together, leave no room for Moun·
tain Fuel or Wexpro to conduct a non-utility business in oil
or gas, subjett Wexpro to Utah regulation as a public utility,
and require Wcxpro to sell gas to Mountain Fuel at cheap
prices (App. A5-6). far below the federal ceiling level for
comparable vintage supply. Further, under the statutory interpretation of the Utah court, any other indepenJent producer
which explores "jointly" with and delivers gas to Mountain
Fuel, whether in interstate commerce or not, "facilitat [es)
the production of natural gas" and is, as well, ~ubject to Utah
~egulation.

12. 'l't:r111i11,1lio11 of 1\1011111,iin f11C'I l:'x/1/ur,1ti1J11 und 01:1·clo/1-

The cvidcntc shows, and it has never been denied, that
if the non-utility oil pn:ipertics were folded into the gas utility
accounts for ratemaldng, the 43-year-old exploration and development program of Mountain Fuel would end. ( R. 2006,
5028, 5033) Mountain Fuel competes for rnpital funds against
oil and gas companies who receive the highest interstate price
for both crude oil an<l natural gas, even though smh com·
panics also recover an exploration expense in their rates and
prices. (R. 4175, 4'110-11) The subsidiiation of Utah gas
consumers with oil profits, and the requirement that Wcxprn
sell gas independent!}' <liscovercJ in other states to .Mountain
Fuc:l at low, cost-of-service prices, will make it impossible to
raise risk capital for the prowam. (R. 155-56, 3'>0, 385-89)
111ml.

REASONS FOR GRANTING Tl-IE WRIT
Utah will now re~ulatc both the price of natural ~as
moving in interstate commerce and the rate of return on interst;1te sales of oil. The State has ;JJso taken tc11s of millions of
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temporarily lowered rates. These actions by Utah raise seri-

the production an<l sale of oil and gas in interstate rnmmcrt:c,
upon preemptive ft:<leral law and policy, and upon constitu-

ous constitutional issues of interference with interstate com-

tionally protettcJ property rights. This petition is so confined.

give a one-time windfall to Utah gas utility customers through

merce, state regulation of subjects preempted by federal law,
That Utah has acted in the guise of regulating a Jistri-

and the uncompensated taking of private property.

bution utility rn::ithcr justif ics its action nor narrows the scope
This case is one of great public.: importance and widespread significance, particularly at a time when energy shortages prese!lt an urgent problem for solution at national and

of the prcrcdent. Hence, Utah's announced rationale for interfering with interstate commerce an<l fcJeral re~ulation -

its utility rntcpaycrs bore the risk of out-of-state exploration

international levels. Utah has attempted to appropriate energy
resources in interstate commerce, much of which does not even

and development -

touch Utah's borders, for purely local benefit. This is not the

red from regulating.

tainty.

prkcs it is rnn~titutionally bar-

tively stated now. 7 With Utah's action as precedent, other
1

only in self -defense. Further litigation of this kind is a cer-

£<1S

The controlling constitutional rules should be authorita-

temptation to pref er local and short-term interests to national
and long-term goals. Utah has succumbeJ to that temptation.
If its attempt succeeds and the decision below stands, other
states and localities will be encouraged to similar attempts, if

docs not, even if it were true, e1npowcr

Utah to fix oil profits and

first time in our history, nor will it be the last, that this Court
has been asked to preserve the federal plan against local incursion. In times of economic difficulty, states are under strong

that

The federal constitutional questions asserted by this petition were
raised below and decided against petitioners. The decision is subject to no further review in Utah. Nothing remains to be done
except the implementation of the judgment by the Utah Utilities
Commission. Justice Wilkins, in his dissent below, characterized
the remand to the Commission as "demonstrably needless" because
the criteria framed by the Utah court had appropriated all Wexpro's
assets under the Commission's undisputed findings. (App. A41-42,
53)

The issues here Jo not turn upon Utah's utility laws but
on principles of federal constitutional law. It could not be
more clear that petitioners Jo not invite this Court to determine the wisdom or propriety of the "no-profit-to-affiliate"
rnncept or the three-pronged utility test under the Utah court
opinion. Nor Jo petitioners request in any sense that this
Court enter upon or become enmeshed !n an accounting or
dassif i(ation proceeding as to the non-utility or utility charack~ of the oil properties. There is no issue prcseutcd involv-

ing ~the classification of oil or gas assets. Rather, petitic~ners

In response to the petitions for rehearing below, respondents adopted the opinion of Justice Wilkins on the nature of the remand, arguing that all of Wexpro's oil profits and properties were to be utHized
to lower Mountain Fuel natural gas rates. Petitioners. however,
urged on rehearing that the Utah court judgment could be interpreted as resulting in a roll-in of less than all of the oil profits and
properties. The Utah court did not respond.
Under any interpretation, there is no c1uestion that on remand Utah
will regulate interstate commerce contrary to the Constitution and
Congressional preemption and that petitioners will suffer an immense
loss in property values and profits of al least lens of millions of
dollars and perhaps as much ilS $150 million. The sole reason these
results have not already occurred is that the Utah Supreme Court
stayed its remittitur of the 111allcr to the Commission so that petitioners could seek review in this Court of the substantial federal
questions presented.
'fhis case is mature for review by this Court bcc<.iusc the fl'dcral
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states and local units of government will attempt to seize nonutilit y assets of other sharehoiJers and bondholders to subsiJiie local consumers at the expense of national interests in
energy dcvdopmc:nt, thus obstructing vital and comprehensive
federal energy policies.

cent from the federal ceiling price of .S l.l 7/Md to the state
resulated price of $..10/Mcf ;!>and

I.
UTAH'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION IS
AN IMPERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE WITH
AND BURDEN UPON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
Utah has obstructed interstate commerce in three ways:
1.

By appropriating Wexpro's .profits ou sales of Wyom-

111g, Colorado, anJ Nevada oil in order to subsidiie natural
gas puces diargc<l Utah ratepayers by the parent, Mountain
Fuel; 11
2.

By rcyuiring Wcxpro to lower the priLe of interstate
natural gas s•tlcs to Mountain Fuel by approximately 68 per1

Continued
questions have been resolved wilh finality, the regulation and taking
are certain and all that remains is an accounting proceeding.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); ltadlo Station
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945).
Review at this time is essential to preserve petitioners' rights.
Continuation of the gas and oil exploration and development program depends upon the coutinuing commitment of risk carital and
the retention of highly skilled management and technica personnel. Neither of these is possible if Utah's action is likely to stay
in effect. Complex and high risk undertakings of this sort cannot
be stopped and started at will. Hence, later review, after extended
proceedings before the Commission, would in all probability come
too late, no matter what the outcome, to save petitioners' exploration and development program and operations.

11

If the non-utility oil properties are folded into the utility gos accounts
for ralcmaking purposes, Mountain Fuel's cost-of-se1·vice production would come to Utah customers at $.16/Mcf rather than the

3. lly subjc.:ding tu Utah utility re~ulation the wellhead
price and sales of other producers who jointly pro<lu<.:e natural
gas with Mountain Fuel outside of Utah and sell that gas to
Mountain i:ucl for interstate transmission to Utah.

There is no doubt ou this record, or indeed, in common
sense, what the results of Utah regulation will be. Wexpro
;and Mountain Fuel wiJJ in all probability have no other optiu11
than to cease efforts to find new discoveries of and to develop
oil anJ gas. Neither Wexpro nor Mountain Fuel can attract
risk capital for oil and gas exploration when the best that can
be expected is a low distribution utility rate of return.
Three lines of authority condemn Utah's extraterritorial
regulation of natural gas .and oil sales.
First, Utah's regulation of oil anJ gas is invalidated by
the Commerce Clause under PmJJ.1)'/1 ,mi,1 1·. IVe.11 Virgini,1,
262 U.S. 581 (1923)~ Northem N,111md G',lf Co. '" Stafr
<:orp<m1lio11 CommiHion, 572 U.S. ~M (J<J6)); 11. P. /food &
Sons, Inc 1·. 011 l\Joml, 336 lI.S. '>25 (19,19); and Pikt' r.
1

Br11t:c Ch11rdJ, ''""·· 397 U.S. U 7 ( l 970).
Pt•11myfrt111it1 1·. IV t:JI Vir,i:i11i,1, .111/>r,1, held unro11sti1u-

tional a West Virginia statute m.1uirin~ pro<lurers an<l dis·
tributors to s~1tisfy lond <.onsumcrs before shippin~ to Ohio
1md Pc11nsylva11ia. This Court stated:
Natur&al ~its is a lawful article of wmmcrce, and its
transmission from 011e state to another for sale anJ
•>Based on a comparison of Mountain f.'ucJ's average cost-of-service

prJcc for ils own gas with· its average field prnduccr price for the
already low 1977 average
price of $.40/Mcf.
year
1977.of Museum
(R. 5031)
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consumption in the latter js interstate rnmmerce. A
state law, whether of the state where the gas is pro-

duced or that where it is to be sold, which by its necessary operation prevents, obstructs, or burdens such
transmission, is a regulation of interstate commen:e,
-a prohibited interference. 262 U.S. at 596-97.
This Court has frcquentl)' reaffirmed the fundamental
principle of Pe1JJ1J)'l1·u11iu '" W eJI V irgiui,1 which prevents a
state from impeding the channels of interstate commerce or
erecting anti-competitive barriers to the free flow of goods
for the benefit of local consumers. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inf.
i·. D11 lvlond, JJJ/>ra; Toomer v. Wi1u/I, 334 U.S. 38) ( 1948);
Duldu·in ''· Seelig, Inc, 294 U.S. 511 ( 1935); Pw1er-P01m1uiu
P,1,;king Co. "· Huydel, 278 U.S. 1 ( 1928). Baldu·i11 held unconstitutional a New York law prohibiting the importation of
milk unless it had been purchased in the producing state at
prices no lower than New York required its producers be paid.
Utah's statutes, as now interpreted, rc(1uirc that natural
gas, produced and sold in Wyoming in interstate commerce,
but Jestii1ed for Utah, be sold at a regulated Utah price well
below applicable federal prices for the benefit of Utah consumers. As a consuming state, Utah has interfered with interstate commerce to protcd local rnnsumcrs, as in l'e1m1y/1°d11i"
''· If/' e.r/ V irgi11i11. Utah has also extended its regulatory arm
into the producing state of Wyoniing, as in Dt1/du•i11, when its
only basis for utility jurisdiction is the retail distribution of
natural gas in Utah.

ing an<l Colorado when that oil is nut even JcstincJ for use

in the rnnsuming state.
The State of Wpm1iug was so wnn.:rne<l wjth the application of the Utah regulation tu Wyoming proJun:rs that it
filed a brief t1111ion mri,w in conncttion with the pttitions for
rehearjng below. Wyoming notc<l that the Utah statute was
interpreted to apply to id I intcrstJtc pro<lu(crs selling gas to
Mountain Fuel and asked:

[ D] oes the Court's application of the Utah statute
mean that a produ(cr of natural gas in W) 01ning mar
be held subjed to the jurisdiction of the Utah Public
Service Commission as a public utjlity if it sells gas
to Mountain Fuel ?
1

The Utah rnurt ha<l already given a dear affirmative
answer to the Wyoming c1u<:stion in its opinion and <lid not
trouble to rcanswer the {1uestion on rehearing.
Scrnn<l, decisions of this Court beginning with Ali.uouri
,1, KtWJaJ N11l1md .G',1.r Co., 265 U.S. 298 ( 1924) an<l culminating in l'hillip.1· Pt:Jro/rnm Co. 1·. IViuomin, 3 l7 U.S.
672 ( 195 11), establish the pri1Kiplc that the wdlheaJ pri(c
of natural g•ts sol<l for transportation or ct:sale across state
lines is itself a trans•tdion in interstate rnmmcrn: and so 11ut
subject to state rc:gulation. Wcxpro in this <.asc sta11ds i11
precisely that position. Phlllip.r invalidates Utah's regulation
of interstate gas s.des to Mountain Fuel by W ex pro and othu
producers.

Moreover, the Utah scheme reaches even further bcyon<l
constitutional limits when its subsidizes its Utah customers by
ex-porting its state regulation to millions of dollars. of _Wexpro profits for the sale of oil i11 interstate rnmmcrce in Wyom-

Third, whatcvn label is used, Utah's appropriation for
lontl ratepayers of Wexpro's profits on oil sales in Wyoming,
Colorado, and Nevada is analogous to. and inJecd indistinguishable from, a tax upon those interstate sales. Any prnf 1t
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

23

\Vexpro makes above a fixed utility rate of return on a sale
of regulated oil, is to be taken and redistributed to Mountain
Fuel's consumers in the form of cheap gas rates. The fact
that the local rnnsumer-beneficiaries are less than all of the
citizens of Utah does not make the exaction any less a tax,
for numerous taxes are levie<l for the bencfit of particular
classes.
The controlling law oo state taxation of interstate commerce is stated in Gmeral 1\loJol'J Corp. ''· If/a1hi11g1011 377
1

U.S.436,441 (1964):

What has really happened here is this: Utah, without all}'

nexus to the interstate rommercc anJ having no taxable incidence of Wexpro's oil business or profits, has nont:theless
undertaken to tax that oil commerce so severely that it will
end - and it has done so under a rationale that will permit
other states to levy similar taxes on the same commerce.
Under all relevant authority, - Utah has interfered with
interstate sales anJ movements of oil and natural gas in a
manner rendered impermissible by the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution.

[T] he decisive issue turns on the operating incidence
of the tax. In other words, the question is whether the
State has exerted its power in proper proportion to appellant's activiti.es within the State and to appellant's
consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protections which the State has af fordc<l.

All of the cases hold that there must be JOI/le nexus be·
tween the rnmmercc and the state taxing it and some fair
proportionality between the tax and the company's activities
within the state. See, e.g., Complele A1110 y,.,11ui1, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 ( 1977). Here there is neither. Utah is
taxing interstate commerce in oH which docs not even touch
its borders. Petitioners have found no case with a tax like
this one because no other state has attempted such a bold
and rapacious charge on interstate commerce.
·Moreover, there exists the prospect of multiple taxation.
Mountain Fuel operates as a gas distribution utility under local
regulation in Wyoming as well as in Utah. If Utah may tax
Wexpro's Wyoming, Colorado and Nevada oil sales because
Mountain Fuel is a distribution utility in Utah, certainly

II.
UTAH'S REGULATION IS PREEMPTED BY
HDERAL REGULATION OF OIL AND NATURAL
GAS SALES.
Utah has rcgulatc:<l both oil anJ gas in conflict with feJeral statutes and policy. au

A. G'em•r11/ fr,111u:11·ork. of Prt:emptil'e Fedn,d Oil ,md N11l1m1/ G'a1 Regu/11/ion.
Production and sale of natural gas ••nd crude oil has bctu
a field of intense fcdernl rn11ccrn and <.:omprehcnsivc, detailed
fcdcrnl reRulation for dcrndcs. Commcnung with the passage
of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, rnntinuing with the Emerg·
ency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, and culminati11R in a

The doctrine of federal preemption extends not only to state laws
or actions that conflict with particular federal statutes, but also lo
state actions which attempt to operate in a field already occupied
Wyoming may also tax Wyoming oil sales and Wexpro's oil
by Congress or which frustrate the achicvmcnt of federal policy.
Uurbunk v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 t 1973); •'Jorlda
sales in Utah, Colorado
and by
Nevada
as well.
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series of energy enactments in 1978, 11 Congress has rnmpletely
lKL'Upicd the ficJJ. State regulation of interstate production
and sales of oil anJ sas has been ousted am.I national policies
established in direct conflict with what Utah has done here.
The national government has taken the more recent of these
actions in response to the worst energy crisis in the history
of this country. Its polic:y is to develop national markets for
oil and gas with uniform prices, to stimulate new exploration
and development through price incentives, and ultimately to
phase out regulation in favor of competitive pricing. u

proJuction and sale of intrastate oil anJ gas. In short, fc:J-

So complete is the federal domination of this f ielJ that
even the traditional area of state regulation, natural monopoly
distribution, has been subjected to federal standards in control
of wasteful practices, rate design, inncmcntal pricing and the
11 Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. U 717-717w 0976 & Supp. 1979); Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627;
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. 94-173, 89 Stat. 871;
Natural Gas Policy of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §I 3301-3432 and 42 U.S.C.
~ 7255 (Supp. 1979); Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978,
Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117: Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95618, 92 Stat. 3174; National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub.
L. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206; Power Plant and Industrial ..'ucl Use Act
of 1978, Pub. L. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289.
1!

eral regulation has been extended to completely eclipse state
regulation in this field. u
ll 1'°fdtm1I Pn:emp1ion of N(1/1m1/ G'aI.

Against the backgroun<l of the comprehensive federal
framework just examined, the invalidity of Utah's regulation
of both gas and oil is clear.
With respect to gas, the Natural Gas Act preserves for
exclusive federal jurisdiction "the sale in interstate rnmmercc
of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption ...
and (sales] to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale .... " Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)
( 1976). See ,drn, Natural Gas Policy Act, I 5 U .S.C. §
3301 (21) (Supp. 1979).
In Phillips P1.:1roh11111 Co.

1•.

lr/iJmmi11, mpr,1, this Court

held:
(T] he legislative history (of the Natural Gas Act]
indiratcs a rnngressional intent to give the Commission
jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natura I

gas in interstate commerce, whether by

<l

pipeline rnm-

The statutory declarations and legislative history leave no room for
pa11y or not and whether occurring before, during, or
argument that a national policy for the uniform pricing of oil and
after tra11smissio11 by an interstate pipeline compa11r.
gas in or affecting interstate commerce and for providing price in347 U.S. at 682.
centives for new production is plainly intended by the Congress.
See, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751 & 3201 (1976 & Supp. 1979), 16 U.S.C. I 2601
( 1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 6201 ( 1976). Public Utility Hcgulatory Policy
Ut•th's rq.;ulation here is 11ot a regulation of tra11sal tio11s
Act of 1978, 11.n. Rep. No. 95-543, p. 10, states:
between a Utah utilitr and its Utah customers. It is, rather,
The natural gas pricing policy adopted by the I Conference I
Committee establishes a single, uniform price for natural
a regulation of interstate s;dcs of natural µ,.1s for resale as
gas produced in the United States.
defined by the Natural Gas Act. The regulated salt:s arc also
See also, Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, ll.H. Hep. No. 95-1752 and
Energy Tax Act of 1978, S.R. No. 95-436, p. 20, where the Senate
11 A slate may not regulate any price of oil even though produced
Committee on Energy and Natural Hesourccs stated:
and consumed intrastate. 15 U.S.C. § 757 ( 1976). It may still reguThe Administration is proposing a system under which price
late the sales price of gas produced and consumed wholly intraco.ntrols would be made more consistent with national polstate,
provided however that the price i11 all t~vcuts docs not
icies. Producers would be given adequate price incentives
exceed
lhcof Museum
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maxi111u111
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transactions by a "natural-gas company" within the Act's rnverngc as st:ttJcJ by Philli/1J. Under that decision, regulation of
sales by •tn independent natural-gas producer is the same as
regulation of sales "by an affjliate of an interstate pipeline
company." 347 U.S. at 68~. Thus, sales from Wexpro and
others to Mountam Fuel are "first sales" in interstate commerce and immune f com state regulation.

<loes not lessen the frustwtion of kJeral preemptive puliq·.
Requiring Wcxpro to <lc:Jiratc its oil prof its to lower Ut;ih
utility gas rates is destructive of the federal objectives of price
incentive an<l new proJuction and thus has exactly the same
impact as state regulation of the price itself. That regulation
is in conflict with aml condemned under the seminal authority
of NorJhem N11J11ral G,11 Co. 1•. S1t1le Co,.poratiun Cu111111iJsiou, 372 U.S. 84 ( 1963). AJthough Nori hem N"J11r11/ dealt
with the Natural Gas Act, the analogy here is direct:

C.

Fnler"/ Prum p1io11 of Oil.

With respect to oil (as well as natural gas), one of the
central objectives of the comprehensive energy legislation, as
set out in the Energy Po liq and Conservation Act, is "Ju
i11ae,1Jt: the J11f'ply of foHil f ue/J in the United States through
pria ina111i1 e.r 111uJ production req11iremenli." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6201(3) (1976) (Emphasis added.) See ,,/w, Emergcnq
Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 75 I (a) ( l) ( 1976).

The federal regulator}' scheme leaves no room eithc:r
for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate
wholesales of natural gas, [citation omitted] or for
state rcgul;itions which would inJirt:ctly achieve the
same result. These state orders 11en:ssarily deal with
matters which directly affect the abilit}' of the Federal
Power Commission [now FERC] to regulate comprehensively and ef frrtively the transportation aud sale of
naturaJ gas, and to achieve the uniformity of regulation
which was an objective of the Natural Gas Act. They
therefore invalidly inva<le the federal agency's exclusive domain. 372 U.S. at 91-92. (Emphasis added)

1

The Utah regulation rnmplctely and effectively frustrates
this federal polity. The uncontrovcrted fact is that as a re·
suit of the Utah scheme, one of the nation's most successful
exploration and development programs will be compelled to
phase out and end. The precise reason is that Utah has taken
away the "price i11n:11tives" that Congress intended. ny re·
yuiring that profits f com oil sales be uscJ to subsiJizc natural
gas rates, the consuming State of Utah has eliminated all incentive and economic capacity for Mountain Fuel shareholders
to continue to bear the risk and expense of further explora·
tion ;rnd development. This form of oil regulation is an open
invitation to other consuming states to rei~ulatc by sei~ing the
profits from oil pro<lurtion and rnllapsin,g those profits into
local gas distribution utility rates.
--The fad that Utah's regulation is by way of sciiing profits
on Wexpro's oil sales. and not regulation of the sales price,

In Feder,1/ Powrr Co111miJJio11 1 Ok./,d><111Jt1 C'or/111ri1/1(1JJ
Co111111iuio11, 362 F. Supp. 522 (1973), 111111111. tiff. ·ii'> U.S.
961 (I 97•i), Oklahoma attempted, in the name of lorn I rnnservation, to "shut-in" wells dedicated to interstate commerrc
havin~ a cheap rnsinghc11J price for the bc11cfit of Oklahoma
producers and consumers. A three judge federal court invalidated the state re,gulation as inconsistent with the preemptive
authority of the Federal Power Commission and also as a11
intolerable burden upon UHnmcrtc. This Court summitrily
11ffirmed. 1•
1

11

•

The dissents of Justices Hchnquist, Stewart und Powell were not
"from any disugrccnwnt with the substantive holding of the District
Court," but run to the standing of the FPC to prosecute the action.
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U.S. at
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Federal preemption of the regulation here follows, ,,
fortiori, from the Ok/,1homt1 Corporation CommiJJion holding.
There, the announced purpose of the regulation was energy
conservation which is also a federal policy. The Utah regulation results in lower production of oil (because of decreased
profits) and higher consumption of gas (because of artificially
lower rates), each of which runs squarely counter to federal
energy palicy:

that permits a company to own anJ operate both utility auJ
non-utility businesses an<l provides that the latter shall not be
regulated. The capital rnsts of an1uiring, <lrilli11g an<l developing non-utility oil properties were pai<l by Mountain Fuel
shareholders from capital contributions, retaine<l earnings, anJ
the sale of debt securities. ShareholJers purchased stock anJ
bondholders lent their credit in express reliance upon the nonutility oil functions of the Company. Mountain Fuel sold oil
at the market price an<l realized rnmpetitive profits. So operated, the oil properties had a market value in excess of S l 50

Government policy ... shoulJ provide for prices that
encourage development of new wells through a more
effedive distribution of production incentives [and]
should also promote conservation by confronting [consumers] with the real cost of oil and gas in the energy
marketplace. Energy Tax Act of 1978, S.R. No. 95-

436, p. 20.
If allowed to spread to other states, Ut•1h's rnnflicting
regulation will not only balkanize the national oil and gas
markets, it will destroy the development of a comprehensive
and uniform federal energy policy during an era of critical
energy shortage. The burden on commen:e of the attempteJ
Utah regulation is patent; its conflict with comprehensive federal policy is startling; and the invitation to other state regulatory bodies to do likewise is undeniable.

III.
UTAI I HAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CONFISCATED
PETITIONERS' OIL PROPERTIES WITHOUT
COMPENSATION.

mil Hon.
Mountain Fud's shardioldcrs owned these non-utility oil
properties for 43 years, to May 9,. 197~. They own them no
more. On M<ty IO, 1979, tl1c Utah Supreme Court gave most
of the value of the oil properties to 1-fou11tain Fuel's natural
gas utility ratepayers. The court did so by dedaring the oil
assets to be "utility properties." (App. A 12) Thus, Wexpao
and its owner, Mountain Fuel, ••re now entitled only to a l1rn
utility gas rate of return, the oil profits being Riven to tht:
gas customers to lower their rates further.
By subjl'cti11h virtually ,di of the oil properties to its regulation, Utah has taken from J\fountain Fuel and its sh•uchol<lers substantial oil profits anJ cilpital values of the oil
properties. The bondholders have lost substantial scrnrity for
the debentures they purchase<l.

The Utah decision is an unrnmpcnsate<l confisLatio11 of
petitioners' property in violatiun of the Fifth Ame11Jme11t.
From the beginning of its corporate existence in 1935
made applicable to the states hy the Fourteenth Amendmc11t,
until 1977 when it transfeue<l them to Wexpro, Mountain
under the principles cnu1Kiate<l by this Court in Penn Cmtr.1/
Fuel owned non-utility oil properties. It <lid so pursuant to
Tr1111J/1or/11tion Co. 1·. City of Nm• York, '138 lJ.S. I0-1 ( 1'J7H)
the Utah Utility Co<le,Sponsored
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as well as, by dose analogy, Allied Srruou,."I SJeeJ Cu. v.
Spam1au1, 438 U.S. 234 ( 1978) anll United SWeI Tru11 Co.
v. New /eHey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).u The central inquiry of
those cases is whether state action has interfered with or demoralized the distinct investment-backed expectation of property owners resulting in substantial loss or the devaluation of
property interests.
Additional factors stressed by those cases as showing an
unconstitutional taking are present here. The property values
taken are substantial and the taking is retroactive. There arc
no alternative valuable uses for the property. Petitioners have
received no compensating benefit There is no public emergency in Utah and no strong public interest relating to these
properties - other than the desire to appropriate most of
their value. Legitimate, investment-backed expectations of
petitioners, the shareholders, and the bondholders have been
destroyed.
It is um1uestio11c<l that the shareholders and bondholders
acted in justifiable reliance upon Utah law. Pursuant to the
Utah Utility Code, Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 (30) (1974),
petitioners' oil business, carried on in other states, was no
more a gas utility business than was Mountain Fuel's ceramic
and britk bus mes~. In fact, petitioners, if auythin~. were more
justified in their dependence upon the nou-utility status of
the oil business than any other, for they had not only the
l Jtah utility statute 1111d tj 3 years of practirnl construction upon
which to rely, but also a series of final orders of the Utilities
1~

31

Commission. The Commission Jecisions not only announn:<l
the principles of the segregated, non-utility character of the
oil properties, but adjudicated the non-utility status of these
specific properties now retroactively dedared to be utility
assets.
The seizure of Mountain fuel oil properties floats, under
the Utah opinion, on two theories ... each patently fallacious.
The first premise is that "the ratepayers [were] the primary
source of risk capital throughout the years" (App. AS), because a share of the <lry hole expenses proportionate to
revenues was allocated to utility an.mrnts and refkcte<l in the
rates. The defect of the argument has already been demonstrated - by a policy announced in advance, no dry hole expense would be reflected in the rates unl.ess the exploration
program resulted in gas for ratepayers at less than the cost
of purchasing the same gas in the market. There was no prospect that a gas customer in paying his bill would contribute
to an unsuccessful exploration and development program and,
therefore, there was no risk to the ratepayer, only to Mountain Fuel and its shareholders.
Mountain Fuel was not fC{fUircJ to explore anJ develop
gas fields; it could have simply purchased pipeline or f icld
produced gas. The share of dry hole expense rcflccte<l in the
utility rates was a q11/d pro quo for cost-of-service gas an<l
would continue 0111)' so Ion~ as exploration resulted in lower
rates. All of this was k11own in aJvante and constituted the
announced rules under which the .Mountain Fuel program went
forward. The ratepayer risk thcorr is, beyonJ ']uibblc. a sham.

Allied Structural Steel and United States Trust Co. involve the impairment of the obligation of contracts, but both decisions arc
directly relevant because the two concepts, impairment of contractual obligation and the taking of properly without just compen-

stands in a "trust relationship to its customers" (App. A·i, 8)

identical.

and must undertake •di steps to sell gas at the cheapest

sation, arc closely parallel and in some rcs11ects conceptually

The second premise of the Utah rnurt is that a utilit)'
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to consumers, induding the dedication of profits from a nonutil ity business. This trust-relationship notion is in square
conflict with this Court's constitutional holding in Board of
Public Utility CommiHionen v. New Yol"k 1'elepho11e Co.,
271 U.S. 23 ( 1926). The New York Commission attempted
to employ in a rate case •rn excess depreciation reserve created
by the telephone company in prior years to off-set future year
deficiencies in telephone revenues. The Court held that the
New York Commission could not reach back and retroactively
utilize assets 'of prior years to offset prospective revenue deficiencies. To do so would be a confiscation of investor assets
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
With respect to the trust-relationship notion, the Court
in Nett· Ymk Telephone said:
The customers are entitled to <lemand service and the
company must comply. The rnmpany is entitled to just
compensation and, to have the service, the customers
must pay for it. 1'he re/,1tio11 heJ u•em the comp•m)'
a11d ilJ rnJtomen is 1101 that of /''"·tneu, •1ge111 and
/>l'infi/>al, or trmlee a11d benefid",.Y· 271 U.S. at 3 l.
(Emphasis added)
The Court also rejected the novel theory adopted by the
Utah court here that a (UStomer an1uires an interest in the
assets of a seller when he pays a purchase price that covers
some or all of the seller's expenses:

In the American cumomy, there is nothing remarkable

about any business. utility or otherwise, recovering all of its
expenses plus a profit in the price it charges for the pro<lul:t
or service it sells - all without the customer participating in
the business profits or the assets that produced those profits.

The facts in this case arc much more extreme than those
which were indicted as a "taking"' in Ne"' York Telephone.
In the latter, the assets and acco~mts which were sought to be
taken by the New York Commission u;ere and alu-ayJ h,1d
been utility· properties. The oil properties of Mountain Fuel
never have been.
Had Utah made a prospective decision that utilities rnulJ
not own non-utility assets, this case would be very different.
But Utah did not do that. The judgment below holds that
the State may consistently - by express statute, by rnnsistent practice, and by spelif ic adjudication for over four
decades - assure the invc!:itor that its policy is not to regulate oil properties, invite investment on that basis, and then,
only after siRnificant oil Jisrnveries had been made and the
world price of oil haJ sharply risen, Jclibcratt:I)' break its
promise and appropriate the value of the investments maJc.
Not only will the Utah decision blunt and dcmoral izc the
investment-backed expectations of bondholders and shardwlJcrs in the capital markets of the nation in similar instances, it
will, if permitted to stand, serve as an incentive for other
states to seize corporate properties to ease the cwnomic condition of voting consumers. 16

Customers pay for service, not for the property used
to render it. ... By paying bills fol' urvice they do
not acquire any intert:JI, legt1/ or eq11i1t1ble, in the prop-·
16 As Mr. Justice Holmes wrote for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal
erty med /or their wm•enieure or in the f 1mdJ of the
Co. v. Mahon, supra:
(0111/''"'.l'· Propert)' paid for out of money received for
We arc in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
service belongs to the company just as does that purto improve the public condition I in this case by lowering
chased out of proceeds of its bonds and stol:k. 27 l
local natural gas rules I is not enough to warrant achieving
desire
by a Services
shorter cut than the constitutional way of
U.S. at 32.Sponsored
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CONCLUSION
The non-utility oil properties of Mountajn Fuel have been
:;eiled and expropriated by Utah without rnmpensation in
contravention of the l~if th and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. Jn so doing, Utah has burdened interstate commerce by attempting to regulate the sale and production of
gas and oil, fields whkh are federally preempted under the
Supremacy Clause.
This petition for certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
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No. 7H-ti04

MOlfNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
\VEXPHO COl\IPAN\", and
_ALEX OHL.AD, fIAUOLD BlTHTON, and
CAHLYLE HARMON,
Petitioners,

v.
l1TAII COl\Il\IITTEE OF CONSUMBR
Sl~HYICES and llTr\II DEPAHTl\IENT
OF BUSINESS llEGULA'J'ION,
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOH A \VHIT OF CEHTIOHAlll
TO TIIE SlfPHKME COlTHT OF
THE S'l'ATl~ OF lTTAH
BHIEF IN OPPOSITION

INTHODl TCTION
The l Ttah 1)ivision of Puhlie l Ttilities and the l l tah
Committee of Consumer Services ( "l Ttali") file this
Brief in opposition to the petition for ~ertiorari of n tah' s
principal natural gas utility, l\fountain Fuel, and its afSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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filiated petitioners ("Mountain Fuel"). 1 l\Iountain Fuel
~'ks federal review of a l Ttah Supreme Court decision
·minating a gross consumer fraud on lTtah's citizens
a fraud the Utah court aptly characterized as a "regttory outrage", in a manner wholly consonant with
L.lh's regulatory mandate and public policy without
e remotest interference, let alone violation of any fedLll constitutional prescription.

that is, to treat the risk of oil and gas e~ploration as a
utility activity to be borne solely by Utah's ratepayers,
hut the profits of successful oil discovery as the fruits of
free enterprise to be enjoyed exclusively hy Mountain
Fuel's stockholders {

(~lJES'l'lONS

PHESENTED

1. Does the fourteenth amendment, the commerce

rnse or federal preemption prohibit Utah from treating l\lountain Fuel's oil and gas properties located in
I Ttah, Colorado and \\Tyoming as utility properties for
rate-making purposes when those properties were explored and developed as utility properties pursuant to a
utility exploration program at the risk of Utah's ratepayers?
~. Under the property guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment does Mountain Fuel have the constitutional
right to conduct an oil and gas exploration program as
a utility activity, charge all of the risk of exploration to
l Ttah ratepayers, and keep all the profits from oil discoveries for the sole benefit of Mountain Fners stockholders'{

3. Docs the fourteenth amendment require ITtah
to grant l\Iountain Fuel the hest of both possible wor1ds,
1

'1'he amicus Mountain States Legal Foundation, which purports
present to the Court a "studied reflection" on this case, is
financially supported by Mountain Fuel and has on its Board of
Directors Wexpro's counsel.
to

4. \Vas Utah constitutionally compelled to accept

l\fountain Fuel's totally unique "oil and gas method of
classification" as the controlling principle for allocating
the benefits from l\lountain Fuel's oil and gas properties
between ratepayer an<l stockholder interesU
5. Does federal preemption or the commerce clause

deprive Utah of regulatory authority over a utility's oil
and gas exploration program conducted in Utah and
other states as a ( 1 tah utility activity at the sole risk of
l Ttah's ratepayers upon the discovery of oiH
G. Is l Ttah's decision to apply the well-established

principle of utility law-gain follows risk-in the allocation of benefits arising from utility activity between
ratepayer and stockholder interest to Mountain Fuel's
oil and gas properties barred by federal preemption or
the commerce clause when those properties whether
located in Utah or adjacent states were explored and
developed as a Utah utility activity at the sole risk of
l Ttah' s ratepayers?

STATEl\IENT OF THE CASE
The sweeping questions l\lountain Fuel attempts
to present are contrary to the uncontroverted facts.
Mountain Fllel's argument is fomLunentally pre111iscd
on three false factual assertions.
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(I) l\lountain Fuel claims Mountain Fuel
conducted its oil and gas exploration program as
a free enterprise, non-regulated activity. On the
contrary, Mountain Fuel at all times conducted
its exploration program as a utility activity.

by l\fountain Fuel iu its utility accounts ~and included
in Mountain Fuel's rate base on which l\lountain Fuel's
2
ratepayers paid a regulated rate of return. (H. 700.)
If leases proved unsuccessful and were cancelled, the
loss on such cancellation was charged to Mountain
Fuel's ratepayers. ( ll. G87-88.) \JI preliminary exploratory work was charged as an expense in l\1 ountain
Fuel's rates. Most important of all, every single dry
hole was charged to l\Iountain Fuel's Utah ratepayers. (Utah J>.S.C. Case Nos. :WOO (rn47), -t7H7
(WHO) and Gann (Jn72); DIV-1; MFS-8; R.. 312U, ()87-8U, G91, 701, :WD".k) From IH47 until 107-J.
Mountain Fuel recovered all of its expense for the exploration and development of oil and gas through charges
in its rates to l Ttah ratepayers and in fact the amount
recovered actually exceeded the amount of expense incurred by l\Iountain Fuel in its exploration activities.
(Utah P.S.C. Case Nos. OHG8 and H7!H (In74); H.
mH.) 3 l\Iountain Fuel did conduct its exploration program in states other than Utah, hut the uncontrovertej
facts were that that exploration program, \vherever con
ducted-in Utah, \ V _,vomine:,
or Colorado-was con
... ,
J_

( ~) l\lountain Fuel claims Mountain }i'uel's
shareholders hore the risk of its exploration for
oil and gas. On the contrary, the ratepayers bore
alJ the risk of .Mountain Fuel's exploration for
oil and gas.
( 3) l\Iountain Fuel claims the decision of the

Utah Supreme Court amounts to retroactive reclassification, whatever that is. On the contrary,
the Utah decision does not recaphire one dime
of oil profits taken by l\I ountain }'uel's shareholders before the initiation of these proceedings,
and only classifies as utility properties for future
rate-making purposes, properties that always were
and should have been so classified.

conducted its oil and gas
oration proyram as a utility activity.
I. Mountain Fuel alt cays

From the iIJception, .Mountaiu Fuel conducted its
ind gas exploration program as a Utah utility ac"
f'·
Unlike rnajor oil companies, independent pro"'c ~rs, or indeed other utilities, Mountain Fuel did not
In up its shareholders' money and take its chances.
Htain Fuel Jct Utah ratepayers put up their money
~ ····~ take the chance of finding oil or gas. A JI of tl1e
wildcat acreage 1\1 mmtain Fuel explored was acquired

The following abbreviations are used for the purpose of cita
tion in this brief: ( 1) "R." refers to the transcript page num
bers from evidentiary hearings before the Public Service Com
mission; (2) "Ord." by date and without case number refers ti
the orders of the Public Service Commission in this case; (3
orders by case number and date only refer to Commissioi
orders in the cited case, and (4) citations to exhibits are ti
the exhibit number used in this proceeding; Mountain Fue
exhibits are referred to as MFS-; Division of Public Utilitie
exhibits are referred to as DIV-; and Salt Lake Count·
exhibits are referred to as SLC-.
·
\ For accounting purposes, the costs of unsuccessful exploratio1
are expensed and the costs of successful exploration are cap

2

italized. Mountain Fuel's shareholders only put their money UL
after exploration proved to be successful.
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<lucted as a lJ tah utility activity, and l\:Iountain Fuel
mly attempted to trausfonn its exploration program
~rom a utility to a no11-utility classification after oil and
~as

were discovered.

only after the successful discovery of oil
that Mountain Fuel attempted to reclassify its oil properties as uou-utility prnperties under lllountain l 1 ·ttel's
wlwlly-rmique oil and gas method of classification.
:2. lt was

\ Vhile l\fountain Fuel explored for oil and gas as
a utility activity, it attempted to transform successful
oil discoveries into non-utility properties beyond regulatory L'ontrol nnder its wholly-unique oil and gas method
of classification. ( H. 1030-31.) Under Mountain l~uel' s
oil and gas method of classification, a successful exploration was classified as an oil or gas well based on the
type of hydrocarbon discovered. ( lHFS-.5; R 71-7:!,
~:!:!, -Vis, 55D, lOB0-31.) If a commercial discoverey
produced pipeline quality gas, the well and related
properties were capitalized in :Mountain Fuel's utility
accounts and the gas distributed to l\Iountain Fuel's
ratepayers as cost-of-service gas, which included, of
course, a profit or rate of return on Mountain Fuel's
capita] investment. (lHFS-5; R. ul.) All other hydrocarbons, whether crude oil, condensate, or natural gas
liquids were classified by Mountain F'uel as oil properties and capitalized hy l\f ountain Fuel in its nonutility accounts. ( Il. 1030-31; 10-t.5.) Mountain Fuel
kept aJl of the profits from these oil properties exclusively for ~fountain Fuel's shareholders. ( S LC-1 at 8;

H. l O:lO-H 1 . )

l\1 ountaiu Fuel's oil and gas methQd of classifica-

tion was Llius use<l by :\lou11tain Fuel for two purpose~
First, it was used hy l\lounlai11 Fuel as a test of Utah'
regulatory jurisdiction. That is, under Mountain Fuer
oil-and-gas method of classification, l\lountain Fut
claimed {T tah lost regulatory jurisdiction upon l\1 oun
tain Fuel's discovery of hydrocarbons other than pipt;
line gas. (Ord. -t/ 11 /78 at ml 11, 6:!, 108.) l\Iountai1u
Fuel also used its oil and gas rnctho<l of dassificatio1:
as a principle of a Boca ting the benefits of its explora
lion program between ratepayer and stockholder interrr
csts. (SLC-1 at 8; H. lOHO-Hl.) ,[\lthough all of Moun
tain Fuel's exploration program for oil and gas was conducted as a unitary utility activity, l\Iountain F'ud's
ratepayers only hent"fitecl upon the discovery of gas.·1
The ratepayers benefited upon gas discoveries by ha ving such gas included in their rates at a cost-of-service
price rather than field or market prices. The cost-ofservice price, of course, included a profit for Mountain
Fuel's stockholders. .A Ithough 1\1 oun ta in Fuel conducted its exploration as a utility activity under its oil
and gas method of classification, it kept all oil discoveries
i

Utah did not argue that Mountain Fuel's exploration program
had failed to benefit Utah ratepayers. Utah's argument was
that Mountain Fuel's shareholders, under Mountain Fuel's oil
and gas method of classification, realized huge oil profits to
which they were not entitled. Mountain Fuel, moreover, in its
petition, grossly overstates the benefits received by Utah's ratepayers. Mountain Fuel, in its petition, for instance, claims that
Utah ratepayers received some $93.8 million in tax deductions
from Mountain Fuel's exploration program. (Petition at 9.)
But the $93.8 million includes all of Mountain Fuel's costs of
unsuccessful exploration that were, in turn, charged to Utah's
ratepayers to the tune of $57 million. Simply, Mountain Fuel
claims that it was to the ratepayers' benefit to pay for the cost
of drilling dry holes.
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for the sole benefit of .Mountain Fuel's stockholders.
ln short, Mountain Fuel used its oil and gas method
of c1assification to achieve the best of both possible
worlds. When it was involved in the high-risk busi11ess of exploring for oil and gas, it conducted that
business as a utility activity and charged those risks to
l Ttah' s ratepayers. '\rhen the risk of exploration was
eliminated and it had discovered oil, l\fountain Fuel
attempted to convert its oil wells to non-utility properties and to keep the benefits or profits from those prope1ties as the fruits of free ente1prise exclusively for its
stockholders. To look at the consequences of l\Iountain
Fuel's oil and gas method of classification in the harsh
light of economic reality, it was Mountain Fuel's position that l\fountain Fuel was able to develop over $250
million in oil reserves for the sple benefit of Mountain
Fuel's stockholders without drilling a single dry hole.
l\Iountain Fuel's claim that its oil and gas method
of classification was required by utility regulation and
that its rejection wi11 have economic and litigation reperssions beyond this one proceeding are wholly false.
mmtain Fuel's oil and gas method of classification
s not required hy any rule or regulation. ( H. ~ao,
2 I, 10~0.) Indeed it was only after the initiation of
t se proceedings in ]!)77 that Mountain Fuel's oil and
g~ s method of classification was ever reduced to writi , '· (Ord. 4/11/78at11 ~:l; MFS-·t, .5; R. 28fl.) Mount'. n Fuel's own chief executive officer acknowledged
at while Mountain Fuel was required under standard
uti1ity regulation to keep separate utility and non-utility
accounts, there was no rule or regulation that required

l\f

......

the division of ~I ountai11 Fuel's oil and _gas properties
between such accounts on the basis of l\lountain Fuel's
oil and gas method of dassification. ( IU~a 1.) The reason
there was no such accepted rule or regulation is because
Mountain Fuel's oil and gas method of classification was
wholly unicp1e not only to the gas utility industry hut
to the entire oil and gas industry. No other company in
the l Tnitcd States has ever used Mountain Fuel's oil
and gas method of classification as a test of regulatory
jurisdiction or as a principle for alloeating benefits between ratepayer and sharehoJder interests. ( H. ~H5-fW;
-J.5H-(>1 ; 870-71 ; ~707.) The uniqueness of l\lountain
Fuel's oil and gas method of classification now belies
Mountain Fuers claim that l Ttah's rejection of that
method of classification raises constitutional questions
of substance for this Court's consideration or to put the
issue in different perspective, helies .Mountain Fuel's
necessary position that the consequences of its oil and
gas method of classification were compelled under the
United States Constitution

a. Uta h's mtepayers

bore all of the risk of JI 01111 -

fain Fuel's exploration for oil and gas.

The risk of exploration for oil and gas is the risk of
not finding oil or gas. A 11 of the risk of oil and gas ex- t
ploration is reflected in the cost of tmsm.:cessful exploration and aJJ of the cost of unsuccessful exploration by ,,
1\( ountain Fuel was charged by l\Iountain Fuel in its ..
rates to Utah ratepayers. From rnn until Hl7:.? l Ttah
ratepayers did not merely pay 1\Immtain Fuel for the
gas they used but also paid all of Mountain F11el's cost
for unsuccessful exploration--every single dry hole.
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(Utah J>.S.C. Case Nos. :.W<W ( IU-17), -i7D7 ( HWO) and
WD (1D72); DIV-1; l\IFS-8;
Bl~-14, ti87-8H, mn,

u.

n, :wu.t.)
.Moun lain Fuel's shareholders or non-utility ac>tm ts were not required to pay one single dime toward
lountain Fuel's cost of unsuccessful exploration until
)7:!. In 197:!, the lJ tah Public Service Commission
1r the first time required l\lountain Fuel's non-utility
~counts, representing the interest of lVIountain Fuel's
rnrehol<lers, to pay $BOO,OOO a year toward MounLin Fuel's cost of unsuccessful exploration. (Utah
•.s.c. Case No. mwn l IU72); n. G88.) In 1974 .Mountain Fuel's non-utility accounts were required to pay
l/a of such cost (Utah P.S.C. Case No. flG68 (1974)
and finally in rnrn, only one year before the 'Vexpro
transactions, 1\Iountain J'uel' s stockholders were required to bear 50% of l\Iountain Fuel's risk of exploration. (Utah P.S.C. Case No. 7113 (IU75); R. 688-89.)
From 1n~.t.7 through 197 4 the amount charged in
.Mountain Fuel's rates to Utah's ratepayers for the cost
of unsuccessful exploration exceeded by over $B million
the amount l\Ionntain Fuel actually spent or incurred
for unsuccessful exploration. (Utah P.S.C. Case Nos.
G668, u701 ( Hl74) ; H. 694.) In short, tluough 1974,
Utah ratepayers bore all of Mountain Fuel's risk of
exploration for oil and gas. Hy 197 4 Mountain Fuel
had already completed its major oil and gas discoveries.
t Ord. -i/11/78 at 'il'il 27-29.) Of the $2.50 million in oil
and gas reserves that ::\fountain Fuel attempted to transfer from its non-utility accounts to 'V expro in December

of 1H7<>, over
ered by I H7·k
1012, 10~5.)

of those reserves hacJ been discov(<>rd. 4/ 11 /78 at m! ~7-:W; DI V-t; ll.

!)() '/;.

It is true that in 1U72 l\Iountain Fuel's non-utility
accounts were required to conunence making token contrihutions to l\J mm lain Fuel's exploration risk and that
from 1H7~ through 1D7H 1\J ountain Fuel's shareholders,
through its non-utility accounts, finally paid over $8
million toward 1\1 oun taiu Fuel's risk of exploratiou.
( D IV-1.) In the same 1H7~- rnrn period, however,
Mountain Fuel's ra tepa ye rs paid ~i 17 million toward
Mountain Fuel's cost of unsuccessful exploration (Id.)
and from 10-1·7 through 1H7H the ratepayers paid over
$.57 million. ( lTtah J>.S.C. Case Nos. ~!)()() ( 1U47),
H27 5 ( 1 !H8)' B5 l 1 ( 1!).)())' ;]();)() ( 1 !);) I ) ' a!)7:! ( 1 n.>a)'
~ian2 (1957), 47n7 (IHOO) and 5D07 (1%8); J)IV-I;
l\l FS-8.) 1\1 ore importantly, the shareholders' contribution that was finally required was only paid out of
the enormous profits from oil properties that had been
discovered at ratepayer risk In 1!>7:! Mountain Fuel
had net profits from its non-utility oil properties of ~q .n
miJlion; in 1H7:1, $2.a million; in 1D7 -t, $7.:! million; i11
HJ7 5, $14.ct million; and in rnrn, the year before \ Vc.xpro, $:!-t million. (SI .C-1 at 8.) In the period, 1H7:!1H7G, when l\Iountain Fuel was finally required to pay
$8 milJion toward 1\1 ou11 ta in Fuel's cost of unsuccessful
exploration it realized over $47 rnilJion in net profits
from the oil properties that had lwen developed at the
sole risk of Mountain Fuel's ratepayers. l\1ountai11
Fuel's costs of unsuccessful exploration were, thus, either
directly paid hy Ptah ratepayers or pai<l from the prof-
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its of oil properties that ha<l been developed at the sole
risk of Utah ratepayers. The total risk, therefore, of
Mountain Fuel's exploration and development of oil
and gas was in economic reality borne by the Utah ratepayers of l\Iountain Fuel. It was this consumer fraud
that was terminated hy the Utah decision that Mountain
Fuel now claims warrants review of this Court.
Mountain Fuel's daim, a claim made for the first
time in this Court, that the risk of exploration charged
to ratepayers was conditioned on the requirement that
l\Iountain Fuel discover and produce cheap gas, is
wholly false. The ratepayers' obligation to pay all of
Mountain Fuel's cost of unsuccessful exploration was
not conditioned in any way. If l\Iountain Fuel had not
discovered a single cubic foot of gas, l\fountain Fuel
and its stockholders would not have had to reimburse
or defray any of the burden placed on Utah's ratepayers.
The record is wholly devoid of any such administrative
requirement. There was simply no money-back guarantee.
4. The IVexpro transactions.

Effective .January I, 1!)77, Mountain Fuel attempt-

e~.· to once and for all remove the oil and gas properties
h ' d in its non-utility accounts from what it perceived
as· the jeopardy of Utah regulation. Mountain Fuel
er ated a wholly-owned subsidiary, \Vexpro, and at, npted to transfer all of the oil and gas reserves held in
its non-utility oil accounts with a market value in excess
of $t.50 million to \ Vexpro. Mountain Fuel also at-

.... , '
, ,,.

tempted to have \ \' expro enter into a juiI!t expluralicm
arrangement with .l\lountain Fuel to explore over :!.U
million acres of oil and gas leases held in Mountain
Fuel's utility acc:onn ts. The transfer of :Mountain Fuel's
oil and gas propertiP-s to \ Vexpro at book value in exchange for all of \\' expro's outstanding .stock was reflected in a J>urchase and Sale ~ \ grecment. ( l\I FS-1.)
The Purchase and Sale i\greement, as amended, required \ r expro to resell all of the gas produced from
the transferred properties to .l\lountain Fuel at costof-service prices. ( l\J FS--!.) The Purchase and Sale
..c\ greement also gave l\J ountain Fuel an option to purchase gas produced hy \\' expro on new acreage at market prices. The joint exploration arrangement was rc~ected in a .Joint Exp]ora ti on .:\ greemen t he tween
Mountain Fuel and \ \' expro. ( 1\1 FS-:!, 5.)
The respondents initiated the proceedings be]ow
to attack the \\' expro transactions. l Ttah claimed that
the Commission had jurisdiction ovor the oil and gas
properties held in :\lountain Fuel's non-utility accounts ,
that such properties were utility properties, and tha t
they should he rolled in or induded in .Mountain Fuel's
utility accounts for rate-making purposes. The Puhlie
Service ('om mission, in a ~-1 decision,' ruled agaiu st
rcspo11dents, and they appen1ed to the l Ttah Supreme
Court.
' The Commission Report & Order set forth at pages 1 to 95 of
Appendix B to Mountain Fuel's petition does not represent t h e
independent product of the Public Service Commission but w a s
adopted verbatim from the order proposed by Mountain Fuel ,
an adjudicatory practice previously critized by this Court. U.S .
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co ., 376 U .S. 651 (1964).
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5. The decisio1t of tlte Utah Supreme Court.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Utah PubServicc Commission. The holdings of the Utah Su~me Court below can be divided for the purpose of
~petition for certiorari between holdings addressed to
,1cs re1ating to the oil and gas properties held in
mntain Fuel's non-utility accounts and holdings ad;sscd to the option of 1\Iountain Fuel to purchase
) produced by \ Vexpro from newly-acquired acreage
market prices and \ \r expro' s regulatory status. The
ldings of the l Ttah Supreme Court addressed to the
and gas properties were by far the most important
and were the focus of the court's decision. These holdings were clear and final.
The Utah Supreme Court held with regard to the
oil and gas properties held in .Mountain Fuel's nonutility accounts (I) such properties were utility properties ( ..:\pp. A 12 ), 6 and ( :! ) such properties should be
included in .l\Iountain Fuel's utility accounts for ratemaking purposes (A pp ..r\8, !) ) . The Supreme Court of
Utah categorically rejected Mountain Fuel's oil and gas
method of classification as a proper test of Utah regulatory jurisdiction or as a proper principle for the allocation of henefits arising from Mountain Fuel's oil and gas
exploration program between ratepayer and shareholder
interest. The bottom line of the Utah Supreme Court's
decision was that the net profits from l\fountain Fuel's
oi1 properties beyond all costs associated with their pro6

The citation '"App. A" refers to the Utah Supreme Court's decision set forth in Appendix A to Mountain Fuel's Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari.

ductiou, including the cost of capital, shoul~l be applil:d
to the benefit of l J tah ratepayers through a reduction
in their future rates (.App . .i\8, H). The court held

the ratepayers were to receive those net profits because
the ratepayers and not 1\1 oun tain Fuel's shareholders had
assumed the risk of exploration for oil and gas ( 1\ pp.
.A 8). The £T tah court reached the same result as .l\Iichigan and California, He M icltigan Consolidated Oas Co.,
78 P.lT.1U3d H~l (Mich. Puh. Serv. Comm'n HW8);
Ile Pacific Oas & 1_,'/ectric Co., !)7 P. U .U.ad H:.!l (Cal.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n I B7:.!), and implicitly followed the
thoughtfo] decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Colnmhia in Democratic Central l"'ommittce v. 11,.ashinutun Tm1v.-it Commission, 485 F.~d
78H (D.C. Cir. mm), cert. denied, -t 15 U.S. 935
1

( H>7 4).

The ( rtah Supreme Court's holding with regard to
l\fountain ]j\1el's option to purchase gas from \V expro
at market prices was occasioned by the past practices
of l\'fountain Fuel. \\'hen gas reserves wound up in
Mountain Fuel's non-utility accounts as a result of
l\'f ountain Fuel's oi1 and gas method of classification,
l\T mm ta in Fuel added insult to injury hy reselling that
gas to Mountain Fuel's utility accounts at market prices,
and then passing on those market prices as an expense
in its rates to l Ttah ratepayers. The Supreme Court of
Ptah, in light of these past practices, adopted a "noprofit-to-affiliates" rule which prohibited such inh·acompany profits from lwing indudecl in consumer rates,
and applied that rule to the 1\Immtain Fucl-\\rexpro
option so as to prevent any profit rea1ized hy \ Vexpro
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under that option from being passed on to l\lountain
Fuel's ratepayers. The Utah Supreme Court also held
that \\' expro, by reason of its relationship as a whollyowned subsidiary of l\lountain Fuel and the unique reexpro created
lationship betwee11 l\I ountain 11... uel and
under the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Joint
Exploration L\greement, was, under Utah law, a public
utility.

l\lountain Fuel's attempt to concoc:_t "substantial
Federal quc:stions" out of the decision below is premised
on fundamental mischaracterization of the court's decision. The lJ tah Supreme Court's decision did not
confiscate anything. The Utah Supreme Court merely
held that oil, and gas properties that had been developed
under a utiJity program at the risk of l Ttah ratepayers
were utility properties on which Mountain Fuel was
only entitled to a regulated rate of return, and that net
profits beyond that regulated rate of return should be
credited to l\f ountain FueJ' s ratepayers to reduce rates.
"'hat Mountain Fuel's shareholders are entitled to have
constitutionally protected and what will be protected
under the decision of the Utah Supreme Court is their
capital investment in l\fountain Fuel's utility oil properties.

'V

\ Vhile the Supreme Court's holding with regard
to the Mountain Fuel-' Vexpro option and 'Vexpro' s
status as a public utility are dear, their finality for the
purpose of certionui is less certain. The Supreme Court
not only set aside the Purchase and Sale Agreement and
the .Joint Exploration Agreement, the Supreme Court
of Utah left open the question of whether 'Vexpro is to
exist at all. Specifically, in footnote 8, the Utah court
said:
There is further posed the serious issue of whether
it is in the public interest for l\fountain Puel to
divi<le its utility function between itself and a
subsidiary. Helevant factors to be considered in
this inquiry include any potential administrative
inconvenience caused by the necessity of regulating two corporate entities performing, in
essence, a singular utility function; and additional
costs and expenses affecting the rate base.
1

1ply put, tl1e question of whether there is going to
L \ \' expro rernaills a Utah regulatory issue.

(). The decision of the Utah SiqHeme {'ourt docs
con/iscate any pro7Jerty of Mountain l''ttel or its
,llL., clwlders, interfere with interstate commerce or conflict with federal energy policy.
.;v

~

The decision below does not "retroactively reclassify" anything. Mountain Fuel's attempt to inject the
slogan "retroactive reclassification" to support its "confiscation" argument is sophistry. Nothing in the Utah
court's holding will affect anything prior to the institution of the 11 'c.rpro proceeding. There is no impact on
rates received or revenues realized under any prior Commission order. 1\1 ountain Fue1 wil1 keep every dime of
the $57 million it received for the cost of unsuccessful
exploration. It will keep every dime of oil profits it received through the end of 1976-profits amounting to
over $47 million. The court's decision will only affect
rates and. revenues after the initiation of the IV expro
case.
The l Ttah decision did not regulate the price, pro-
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duction or profits of oil an<l gas sold in interstate comierce. The l J tah decision did not remotely attempt to
~gulate the price at which oil or gas is sold by l\Iountiu Fuel or \ V expro to others, nor does it even regutte the price at which \ Vexpro sells gas to Mmmtain
'uel under the l\I ountain Fuel-\ V expro option. .All
l1at the Utah Supreme Court held \vith regard to the
\' cxpro-l\Iountain Fuel sales is that any profits realized
'Y \ Vexpro could not he included as charges in l\Iountin Fuel's rates to Mountain Fuel's customers under
lie "no-profit-to-affiliates" rule.
By holding that the tmic1ue relationship between
Fuel and \ Vexpro resulted in \Vexpro being
classified as a public utility, the Utah Supreme Court
did not liold an<l did not even state that independent
parties other than \Vexpro would he classified as public
utilities hy reason of their normal business relationships
with l\fountain Fuel. The Utah Supreme Court did
not attempt to regulate the price of nah1ral gas sold to
Mountain Fuel for resale by independent parties or to
('lassify such independent suppliers as public utilities.
Indeed, TTtah has a statute that expressly exempts such
independent suppliers from classification as a public
utility. Thus, section 5".t-2-l ( :30) provides in material
part:
~Iountain

Such person, company, corporation or association
se1ling or exchanging such surplus product under
such authorized contract shall not thereby become a public utility within the meaning of this
act, nor sliaJI it he snhject to the jurisdiction of
the 'cornrnission. . . . § 5-t-2- l (BO), lT.C.A.
1!)5:3.

.An<l finally, the l Ttah Supreme Court's clecision does
not prevent any independent party from engaging in
joint exploration with l\fountain Fuel under the penalty of being classified as a public utility. \ Vexpro was
not an independent party. 'Vex pro was created as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of l\Iountain Fuel for the sole
business purpose of receiving all of the oil and gas properties held in lVIountain Fuel's non-utility accounts and
to explore with 1\1 ountain Fuel the valuable wildcat
acreage held in l\Jouutain Fuel's utility accounts. It
was intimately involved in an attempt to secure with
finality hundreds of millions of dollars of oil and gas
reserves that had been developed at ratepayer risk for
the benefit of l\Iountain Fuel's shareholders, and to
grab enormously valuable exploration rights on over 2.9
million acres of oil and gas leases held in Mountain
1~--uel's utility accounts. There was nothing independent
about \Vexpro, and there is nothing in the fVexpro decision by the Utah Supreme Court that regulates,
threatens or interferes with independent producers or

sellers.
REASONS FOH DENYING THE \\'Hl'l'
1. The Utalz Supreme Court's

decision does not

raise any issue of constil utional confiscation.
Mountain Fuel's claim of constitutional confiscation
amounts to a claim that i\Iountain Fuel is constitutionally entitled in its exploration program to the best of
hath possible worlds-the worlds of utility regulation
and private enterprise. l\lonntain Fuel under its "oil"
and "gas" method of classification asked lo he treated
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as a utility wheu it was engaged in the risk of exploration. It wanted to be treated as a utility by having its
wildcat acreage capitalized iu its utility accounts as
property held for future use, when it incurred losses 011
wildcat acreage by including as a charge in its rates
the expenses of cancelled leases, when it did geophysical
and seismic work preparatory to exploration, and when
exploration was unsuccessful and resulted in dry holes.
But Mountain Fuel wanted its exploration to be transformed into a private enterprise as soon as oil was discovered. It wanted to he treated as a private enterprise
under its "oil" and "gas" method of classification where
the benefits of profits of its oil properties were concerned.
The simple answer to l\Iountain Fuel's claim of
constitutional confiscation is that the constitution does
not guarantee a utility the hest of both possible worlds.
The constih1tion does not guarantee a utility can charge
its ratepayers the cost of service for the gas they receive,
· 1 addition ca11 charge its ratepayers for all the cost of
nsuccessfnl exploration, ,m<l then keep the unregulated
~turn from oil properties discovered through such exloration solely for the benefit of stockholders.
Under tlie Ptah Suprelllc Court's decision l\lounin Fuel a1Jd JU oun ta in Fuel's stockholders receive the
mstih1tional protection to which they are entitled.
'hat J\1 ouutain Fuel's .stockholders are entitled to have
oteete<l, aud what wiJJ he protected under the lT tali
1prenw Court's decision, is their capital investment.
Pederal l'ower Commission v. II ope Natural Oas Co.,

~

21
B:!O U.S. ;JH I ( rn H) ; Li11dheimer v. 1 Llinois Jfr/L Telephone Co., :!Hi U.S. 151 ( rna.:t); see al~·u, Nehbia v.
People of the State of New Y'ork, iOl l T.S. 50i ( rna-1).
The roll-in of 1\1 ountain Fuel's utility oil properties and
associated revenues and expenses under the Utah Supreme Court's decision will result in the full protection
of l\lountain Fuel's stockholders' capital investment in
utility oil properties. All the costs associated with the
operation and production of 1\1 ountain Fuel's utility oil
properties, including a rate of return or profit on the
stockholders' capital inveshnent, will inure to the benefit
of Mountain Fuel's stockholders. That is the protection
required by the constitution and that is the protection
that Mounb1in Fuel's stockholders will receive under
the court's decision. \ Vhat the stockholders will not
receive are the net profits of l\Jountain Fuel's utility
oil properties beyond all costs assodated with their production. Ueyond such costs those profits will be allocated to its ratepayers under the l Ttah Supreme Court's
decision, for those profits are profits attrilmtahle to tlw
risks of exploration, the risks that were exclusively borrn

by l\Jountain Fuel's ratepayers.
This ( 'ourt has squarely held that there is no con
stitutional right to nou-regulation and certainly there i:
no constitutional right to the continued acceptance o
Mountain Fuel's oil and gas method of classificati01
that arbitrarily and improperly removed utility prop
1
erties from the jurisdiction of the Commission. J1 cdcra
Power Commission v. Natural Uas Pipeline, ill 5 lT .S
575 (UH~); .iVebhia v. J>copfc of the State of Ne1
York, s111n·a; Cotto11wood 11/all Slw7>pi11u Center v. Uta'
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Power & Light Co., -1--W F.:!<l :w ( 1Oth Cir. I !l7l). The
argumeut that ~lountain Fuel makes was precisely the
constitutional attack made agaiust the Natural Gas Act
of I H:38 which for the first time placed natural gas pipeliues under federal regulation and made such pipelines
subject to a regulated rate of reh1rn. The Court made
short shrift of that argument and stated, "[T] he business ... is not any the less subject to regulation now
because the governrnent has not seen fit to regulate it
iu the past." Federal J>orccr Co1111nission v. Xatural
Gas Pipeline, su1>ra, at .588.

fiscation, but is valid regulation of public ~1tility activity
in the public interest. This principle of allocation has
been adopted without exception by every single judicial
an<l administrative decision in every jurisdiction which
has ever addressed the question. Bebchick v. JVashington Transit Commission, supra; New York JVater Service Corp. v. Public Service Commission, supra~· Hl Paso
..Vatural Gas Co., supra; Re .Michigan Consolidated Oas
Co., su71ra; Ile JVyorning Gas Co., supra. The claim of
"confiscation" is a red herring.
2. The Utah Supreme Court's decision does not

The roll-in of oil properties, revenues and expenses
is not confiscation at all, but is an application by the
l Ttah Supreme Court of the controlling principle unifonnly foJJowed hy <.:ourts and commissions in a11ocating
benefits arising from utility activities between ratepayer
and stockholder-gain foJlows risk. Democratic Central
{'onm1ittcc v. Jrashington Transit Commission, 485
F.2d 78H ( D.C. Cir. mm), cert. denied, -t.n l r.s. 935
(Hl7-t); Uchchick c. IJ~ashington Transit Commission,
-(·85 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1H7H); Xew York Jtratcr
Service Corp. v. Public Service Commission, I:.! App.
Div.:.!d 12:!, :W8 X.Y.S.:.!d 857 (lntiO); El Paso .Xatuml Oas Co., Docket No. CP7i>-H<>2 (FEHC 1977); Ue
JI icliiga11 Cu11so/id{~f ed Oas Co., 78 P. U. H.ad :l:.! 1
( l\Iich. Puh. Serv. Cornm'n l !Hi8) ; He 1Vyo111ing Uas
Co., -W P. U.H.ad 50!> nvyo. Puh. Serv. Comm'n
1%1 ) . The principle that he who hears the financial
burden of particular utility activity should also reap the
benefit resulting therefrom I )emocratic Central Com.·
111ittee, supra, at 80fi, does not raise an issue of con·
L

)

raise any issue of undue burden or obstruction of interstate com11ierce.
l\.fountain Fuel's claim the l Ttah Supreme Court
decision burdens or obstructs interstate commerce is
wholly without merit.
(a) l\lountain Fuel attempts to argue that the
Utah Supreme Court's holding addressed to the Mountain Fuel-\ Vexpro option obstructs commerce by regulating the price of interstate sales of gas from \ V expro to
:Mountain Fuel.7 The decision below does nothing of
the sort. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court requires the
Public Service Commission to allow in retail rates onlv
the cost of service on gas sold by \V cxpro to Mountain
Fuel. The court does so under the "no-profit-to-affiliates" rule, applying the wel1-estahlished principle that
While the question whether Wexpro is to exist at all is still
open, see § 5, supra, there is no commerce clause issue raised
. by this case whether Wexpro exists or not. For the purpose of respondents' argument respondents assume that Wexpro
will be in business.

1
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shareholders should not be able to make a profit at the
expense of ratepayers 011 transactions between affiliated
companies where there is no arm's-length bargaining.
H cgardless of whether or not \\' expro' s gas comes from
inside or outside l r tah, this holding is fully in line with
constitutional doctrine established by this ( 'onrt. This
Court has consistently held ~l state, in retail ratemaking,
may determine a reasonable charge on interstate sales
of nah1ral gas between affiliates without violating the
commerce clause. ln Lone /')"tar Gas Co. v. 1 1exas, 304
IT.S. ~~4 ( rnaH), this Court expressly rejected the argument that a determination by the Texas commission of
a reasonable rate for gas sold interstate to a utility by
au affiliated pipeline company was invalid under the
commerce clause. Lone Star Gas was consistent with
and followed the rule laid down in Dayton Power "'~
Light Co. v. Public l 7 tilities Commission of Ohio,
:w~ U.S. ~oo ( rna-:t) aud IV est em Distributing Co. v.
Public Service Co11w1ission of Kansas, :.!8:5 CT.S. 1 rn
(I Ha~). In IV estern /)istributin{f, the Court explained
hy a state inquiry into the reasonableness of a charge
f an affiliate for gas sold interstate does not circummt paramount federal authority over interstate comerce:
Those in control of tl1e situation have combined
the interstate carriage of the commodity with its
local distribution in wliat is in practical effect one
organization. There is an absence of arm's length
bargaining hctweeu the two coq)()rate entities involved, and of aH the elements which ordinarily
go to fix market value. The opportunity exists
for one member of the combination to charge
the other an unreasonable rate for the gas fur-

L

25
nished and thus to make such unfair charge in
part the basis of the retail rate. The~ state authority whose powers are invoked to fix a reasonable rate is certainly entitled to be informed
whether advantage has been taken of the situation to put an unreasonable burden upon the
distributing company, and the mere fact that the
charge is made for an interstate service does not
constrain the Commission to desist from all inquiry as to its fairness. Any other rule would
make possible the gravest injustice, and would
tie the hands of the state authority in such fashion
that it could not effectively regulate the intrastate service which unquestionably lies within its
jurisdiction. 1Vestern Distribution Co., supra,
at 124-25.
The Utah Supreme Court's holding on this point was
especially sound in this case in light of the fact that in
the past l\Iountain Fuel has achrnlly heen selling gas
from its non-utility accounts to its utility accounts at
market prices, and then passing on those market prices
as an expense in rates to l Ttah ratepayers. The commerce clause under this Court's doctrine does not proscribe a state from putting a stop to that kind of practice.
( b) Mountain Fuel's argument that the rolJ-in of
oil properties and profits obstructs commerce is based
on a fundamental misstatement of the Otah Supreme
Court's decision. l\f onntain Fnel misrepresents the
court's holding by arguing that it regulates production,
prices and profits on interstate sales of crude oil developed in states other than l Ttah. That is false. On
the contrary, aJI the l Ttah Supreme Court held with regard to l\1ountain Fuel's oil profits is that net profits
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beyond all costs assodated with production, including
the cost of capital, from oil developed as a utility activity
at the sole risk of ratepayers, should benefit Utah's
ratepayers. This is rate-making, not regulation of production, price or profit.

l\I ountain Fuel's contention that the roll-in of oil
properties and profits violates the commerce clause because oil is developed and so] cl outside Utah is again
contrary to the doctrine of this l 'uurt. This Court has
squarely held that the commerce clause does not prohibit a state, in eslablishing utility rates, from classifying
as utility properties for rate-making purposes properties
located in other states. In Lone Star Oas Co. v. Texas,
supra, this Court upheld, without re<1uiring segregation
of out-of-state properties from the rate base or segregation of revenues and expenses associated with those
properties, an order of the Texas Hailroad Commission
reducing natural gas rates charged by a Texas utility.
This was not a case where the segregation of
properties and business was essential in order to
confine the exercise of state power to its own
proper province [citation omitted]. Here, as we
have seen, the Commission in its method of dealing with the property and business of appellant
as an integrated operating system did not transcend the limits of the state's jurisdiction or apply
an improper criterion in its determinations. I~one
Star Oas Co., supra, at :241.

Cf. Capital Trnnsit Co. 1;. J>uhlic l 'tilities eommissio11
n.('., :.n a F.:!d l rn, 17n-81. ( D.C. Cir. rn.53).

regulatory reality. l t is both necessary au<l c:onunon for
public utilities throughout this country to utilize out-of.state properties tu provide services to consumers in their
state of service. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric
Company, in serving energy to CaJifornia consumers, ex8
plores and develops oil and gas properties in Alaska.
Mountaiu Fuel itself explores for and develops hydrocarbons in \\r yenning and Colorado for the purpose of
providing natural gas to ratepayers in Utah. llecause
out-of-state properties are necessary to provide utility
services, state public utility commissions have to include
these properties in rate base and calculate rates on the
basis of revenues and expenses from them. Mountain
-Fuel's commerce clause argument would have the
effect of handicapping utilities in developing adequate
sources of power to serve their consumers, and would
handicap utility commissions in exercising the regulatory powers they need to set rates. Therefore, not only
is 1Vlountain -F'uel' s argument contrary to this Court's
doctrine, hut it wouJd have the effect of stripping public commissions of power they use as a matter of course
on a day-to-day basis. Mountain Fuel's position that
this common practice violates the commerce clause is
constitutional nonsense.
( c) l\fountain Fuel's final daim the decision below burdens interstate commerce is based on the totally
false premise that the holding of the l Ttah Supreme
Court will regulate as public utilities independent

of

R

Not only is l\I ountain Fuel's argument wrong as a
matter of this Court's doctrine, hut it flies in the face of

See, e.g., Re Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 321 (Cal.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 1972), where the California Commission
gave ratepayers the benefits in rates of profits on oil discovered
by the utility in Alaska.
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parties jointly exploring with Mountain Fuel and will
regulate interstate gas sales between independent parties
and l\Iountaiu Fuel. These premises are categorically
false and are a misstatement of the Utah Supreme
Court's holding. The issues in this case solely concern
:Mountain Fuel and its wholly-owned subsidiary, 'Vexpro, and the court's cledsion makes no holding and has
absolutely no ramifications with respect to independent
parties.

a. The Utah Supreme Court's decision does not
raise any issue of preemption.

l\Iountain Fuel's claim that the Utah Supreme
Court decision regulates both oil and gas in conflict
with federal statutes and policy is also nonsense. l\Iountain Fuel attacks both the court's decision prohibiting
\ \T expro to make a profit on its sales of gas to l\fountain
Fuel at ratepayer expense, and the holding benefiting
ratepayers by rolling in oil profits on utility properties
explored and developed at ratepayer risk. Neither of
hese holdings is remotely preempted by any federal
-tatute, rcg1dation or policy.

~

l\fountain Fuel claims the Natural Uas Act prempts the ITtah Supreme Court's holding preventing
fountain Fuel from passing on in rates any more than
l1e cost of service 011 natural gas it obtains from \Vexro. In making this argument, Mountain Fuel mis1ialyzes the r Jtah Supreme Court's decision. The de. sion does not regulate wholesale prices, but prohibits
· ~ofits on wholesale sales between l\I ountain Fuel and
ts wholly-owned subsidiary, \Vexpro, from being

29

charge<l to ratepayers iu the retail price af gas. This
action is fully consistent with this Court's holdings on
this very point. Contrary to .Mountain Fuel's position,
the Natural Gas Act left it to the states to do exactly
what the court below mandated. Prior to the passage
of the N ah1ral Gas Act, this Court held consistently
and squarely the states had constitutional power to
regulate charges in retail rates for natural gas purchased
from affiliates, regardless of whether or not the gas was
purchased from the affiliate in an interstate transaction.
1Vestern Distributing Co., supra; Dayton Power q; Light
Co., supra; Lone Star Oas Co., supra. The Natural Gas
Act had no effect on that authority. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. .Michigan Public Service Commission, 341 U.S. B:lH ( 19.51); Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana,
3H2 U.S. 507 {In-17). The Natural Gas Act "had no
purpose or effect to cut down state powe!r." Panhandle
v. Indiana, supra, at ;)17. The Natural Gas 1\ct was
not intended and could not have been intended by Congress to render states helpless to protect consumers
against affiliated companies' price manipulations, when
the Court prior to the Act had held the states had clear
power to provide consumers such protection. This Court
stated in Panlumdle v. Indiana, supra, with respect to
the Act:
[P]erhaps its primary purpose was to aid in
making stale regulation effective, by adding the
weight of fcdt>ral regulation to supplement and
reinforce it in the gap created by the prior dedsions. 'l'he Act was drawn with meticulous re-
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Nothing in this chapter prohibits any State
regulatory authority or nonregulated gas utility

gard for the continued exercise of state power,
not to handicap or dilute it in any way.

*

*

*

from adopting, pursuant to State law, any stand
ard or rule affecting gas utilities which is differ
ent from any standard established by this chap
ter. 15 U.S.C. §3~08. 9

*

It would be an exceedingly incongruous result

if a statute so motivated, designed and shaped to
bring about more effective regulation, and particularly more effective state regulation, were
construed in the teeth of those objects, and the
import of its wording as well, to cut clown regulatory power and to do so in a manner making
the states less capable of regulation than before
the statute's adoption. Id. at .517-19.
Therefore, ~Iountain Fuel's argument that Utah is constitutionally required to allow its natural gas public
utility's stockholders to make a profit at ratepayer expense on gas "purchased" from its wholly-owned subsidiary is simply wrong.
Mountain Fuel argues that the entire decision of
the Utah Supreme Court is preempted by "federal regulation [which] has been extended to completely eclipse
state regulation in this field." (Petition at 25.) 1Vfountain Fuel cites a string of federal statutes, including the
Natural Gas Act, in support of this fatuous proposition
(Petition at :!-~, n. 11). But federal stah1tes have not
eclipsed the field and "ousted" state regulation. The
very statutes cited by :Mountain Fuel belie that proposition. Congress has expressly recognized in these
statutes the traditional powers of the states over oil and
gas matters. The absurdity of Mountain Fuel's position
is seen, for example, in the Public Utility Regulatory
Policy 1\ct of 1H78, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201, et seq. (1978).
That stah1te expressly provides:

There is no pattern of ( ~ongressional hw "eclipsing th
field." In fact, Cougress has demonstrated its inten
not to do so. Nor is there any conflict between an:
federal policy, statute or regulation and the holding
of the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Com
does not in any way regulate production, price or profi
of oil or gas. It rather articulated and implementej
uniformly accepted principles of ratemaking. Allocation
of profits according to the principle gain follows risk is
not regulation of production, price or profit. l\Iountain
Fuel necessarily misstates the holdings because it realizes an accurate reading of the decision raises no federal issue of any sort.
Once again, 1\Iountain Fuel's position flies in the
face of regulatory reality. l\I ountain I~~uel would have
this Court eliminate all classes of state regulation over
any aspect of the oil and gas business. It would eliminate state regulation preventing waste of oil and gas.
1 t would eliminate state regulation promoting conservation. It would eliminate state boards with the juris'> See also the Federal Energy Petroleum Allocation Act, cited
by Mountain Fuel, which again demonstrates Congress' recog-

nition that federal regulation has not "completely eclipsed" the
field. This Act, by its express terms, preempts only state regulation over allocation of refined petroleum products which are
in actual conflict with regulations promulgated pursuant to it.
15

u.s.c.

§755(b).
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diction and authority necessary to promote conservation.
It would eliminate state laws requiring well permits

Finally, the claim that this decision will !nvite other
states to "sieze profits" from utilities rings hollow. The
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a wholly-unique
problem. No other utility in this country ever developed
this unique system of classification to give its shareholders the best of both worlds in its exploration and
development of oil and gas at the expense of ratepayers.
Mountain I~.,uel' s conduct was unique and the decision
will not have the ramifications claimed by Mountain
Fuel. JVIountain Fuel's claim that this abuse of lJ tah
consumers rises to the level of constitutional principle
warrants no consideration by this Court.

and the spaciug of wells. 10 The argument is simply
uu tenable.

Mountain Fuel states that the Utah Supreme
Court's decision frush·ates federal policy by "siezing
profits" on
expro's oil sales because Mountain Fuel's
"exploration and development program will be compelled to phase out and cnd.n (Petition at :W.) This is
nothing more than a thinly-veiled temper tantrum by
Mountain Fuel's stockholders who threaten to end their
exploration program if they do not get their own way.
nut a temper tantrum does not produce a federal constitutional issue. Mountain Fuel's contention the decision eliminates price incentives in violation of federal
policy is wholly inaccurate. Price incentives are not
eliminated by the decision. l\Iountain Fuel has always
been free, and still is free, to engage in a free-enterprise
I and gas exploration program of its own. Mountain
l 3} has the same price incentives as any other corny. A II it needs to do is put its stockholders' money
1·isk, rather than use the profits generated by its
ity program to foster the enterprise. Nor i.s the
at to end the program credible, because this temper
1 rum caunot limit Mountain Fuel's obligations under
h Jaw to serve as a puhlic utility under l Ttah's reg'.)ry authority.

"T

10

CONCLUSION
The Petition for "rrit of Certiorali should be
denied.
DA TED this :?8th day of November, 1H7!l.

He.spectfully submitted,
HOBEHT B. HANSEN
Attorney General of the State of
Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 H

See, e.g.,§§ 40-6-1, et seq., U.C.A. (1953).
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